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[T]he defendant, personally, [should] have the opportunity to present to
the court his plea in mitigation. The most persuasive counsel may not be
able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting elo-
quence, speak for himself.'
[E]very victim must be allowed to speak at the time of sentencing. The vic-
tim, no less than the defendant, comes to court seeking justice. When the
court hears, as it may, from the defendant, his lawyer, his family and
friends, his minister, and others, simple fairness dictates that the person
who has borne the brunt of the defendant's crime be allowed to speak.'
INTRODUCTION
Most of us feel honored when we are asked for our opinions on a matter or
are asked to tell our story. Even for an individual who may be shy about speak-
ing publicly, knowing that others care enough to ask about her thoughts is en-
Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961). For the sake of linguistic ease and
efficiency, and unless discussion of a particular case requires otherwise, I will use
masculine pronouns and adjectives to describe defendants, as the majority of de-
fendants are male. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 419 (2003), available at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/index.html (noting that 85.3% of all convicted
federal defendants in 2001 were male). When discussing victims, I will alternate
my use of feminine and masculine pronouns.
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nobling. The same is true when she has the opportunity to stand before a court
of law and present her views. Being afforded the right to participate in the sol-
emn rite of a trial signals to the speaker that what she has to say is valued. She
has been called to participate in one of the weightiest of our community rituals
because her presence and observations are deemed an important part of the le-
gal process. The speaker's views may not prevail, but her insights, experiences,
and contributions are nonetheless acknowledged and validated by the mere fact
that she was heard in an official forum.
An individual's right to address the court also directly contributes to the
perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system. We claim our criminal
processes are fair because they are open, public, and seek to ensure that all rele-
vant voices are heard prior to the court's pronouncement of innocence, guilt, or
punishment.3 Being heard in a court of law, therefore, is intrinsically linked to
notions of due process. From this reasoning, victims' rights advocates have ar-
gued that the right to be heard, which is granted to the defendant and govern-
ment during criminal proceedings, should also be granted to victims.
Proponents of victims' rights claim that over the course of our nation's his-
tory, the scales of justice lost their balance, tipping out of proportion in favor of
defendants and to the detriment of victims. The fair treatment of defendants
throughout the legal process was viewed as paramount, while victims became
"'faceless stranger[s]"' 4 expected to "behave like good Victorian children-seen
but not heard."5 The victim-who has a substantial personal interest in the trial
second only, perhaps, to the defendant-was sidelined and excluded. Over the
last twenty to thirty years, victims' rights advocates have sought to change this
status quo.
Promoting balanced participation between victims and defendants in the
criminal justice system, victims' rights advocates often quote Justice Cardozo's
statement that "justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also.
The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We
are to keep the balance true."6 Building upon Justice Cardozo's idea, victims'
3. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571-73 (1980).
4. Payne v. Tennessee, 5o U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (quoting South Carolina v. Gathers,
490 U.S. 805, 821 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
5. Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court (Kenna I), 435 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 2006).
6. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934), overruled on other grounds by
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). For articles referencing Justice Cardozo's
statement in the course of advocating for the expansion of victims' rights, see
Douglas E. Beloof & Paul G. Cassell, The Crime Victim's Right To Attend the Trial:
The Reascendant National Consensus, 9 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 481, 537-38 (2005);
Jon Kyl et al., On the Wings of Their Angels: The Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper,
Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims' Rights Act, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 581, 605-o6 (2005); John W. Stickels, Victim Impact Evidence: The
Victims' Right that Influences Criminal Trials, 32 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 231, 242
(2001); and Steven J. Twist, The Crime Victims' Rights Amendment and Two Good
and Perfect Things, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 369, 372.
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rights advocates argue that giving victims an established place within criminal
procedure will not only better serve victims but will also promote a more equi-
table, fair, and just system. Indeed, over the last thirty years, the victims' rights
movement has taken strides toward creating a pronounced place for victims
within criminal law.
One area where victims' rights advocates have made particular progress is
in victims' increased participation at sentencing. Congress's most recent piece
of victims' rights legislation, the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 7 highlights
the victim's expanded role, as it grants to victims an express, enforceable right
to be present and "reasonably heard" at sentencing in federal courts.8 In dis-
cussing the scope of this right, courts and commentators have embraced advo-
cates' calls for balance between the rights afforded to victims and defendants. In
so doing, they have referenced the defendant's sentencing allocution right as the
model for victim allocution.9 For example, in United States v. Degenhardt, the
court commented:
One must note, however, that Justice Cardozo's statement did not address
the relationship between offenders and victims, but rather the relationship be-
tween the prosecution and the defense. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 104-05 (holding that the
jury's view of crime scene where the defendant was not also present did not vio-
late the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process); see also, e.g.,
Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (holding that the state should be able to present evidence at
a capital sentencing hearing regarding the victim and the harm she suffered, in
order to counter mitigating evidence presented by the defendant); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 519 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (challenging the Court's
decision to suppress a defendant's confession for alleged unfairness in police
questioning); Haggins v. Warden, 715 F.2d 1050, 1058 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that
the state's evidence was admissible under the excited utterance exception to the
hearsay rule); Virgin Islands v. Brown, 507 F.2d 186, 19o (3d Cir. 1975) (rejecting
the defendant's proposition that he had a unilateral right to select the trial date,
irrespective of the needs of the state and the court).
7. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (West 2007). The Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) was
signed into law by President George W. Bush on October 30, 2004. Under the Act,
the term "crime victim" means a person directly and proximately
harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in
the District of Columbia. In the case of a crime victim who is under 18
years of age, incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased, the legal guardians
of the crime victim or the representatives of the crime victim's estate,
family members, or any other persons appointed as suitable by the court,
may assume the crime victim's rights under this chapter, but in no event
shall the defendant be named as such guardian or representative.
Id. § 3771(e).
8. Id. § 3771(a)(3)-(4).
9. Allocution is
[a]n unsworn statement from a convicted defendant to the sentencing
judge or jury in which the defendant can ask for mercy, explain his or her
conduct, apologize for the crime, or say anything else in an effort to
lessen the impending sentence.
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[Tihe sentencing process cannot be reduced to a two-dimensional,
prosecution versus defendant affair. Instead, the CVRA treats sentenc-
ing as involving a third dimension-fairness to victims-requiring that
they be "reasonably heard" at sentencing.. .. [Tihe CVRA commands
that victims should be treated equally with the defendant, defense
counsel, and the prosecutor, rather than turned into a "faceless
stranger."'"
Similarly, in Kenna v. United States District Court (Kenna I), the court held that
the CVRA gives victims the right to speak at sentencing and interpreted the Act
to place "crime victims on the same footing" as defendants." However, in call-
ing for broader rights for victims at sentencing, victims' rights advocates have
done little beyond invoking comparisons between the rights granted to defen-
dants and those afforded to victims. There has been very little discussion about
whether the two practices can indeed be equated and, if so, how they inform
one another. This Article engages in that analysis.
Despite the arguments offered by victims' rights advocates that victims'
rights should be on par with defendant's rights, an examination of defendant
and victim allocution makes clear that the two practices do not serve as mirror
images for one another. Defendant allocution exists primarily to make a calcu-
lable difference to the defendant's sentence. Conversely, the goals underpinning
victim allocution are more expansive in their scope. While victim allocution ex-
ists partly to give victims an opportunity to provide information that could af-
fect the court's sentencing determination, the practice also exists to enhance the
dignity of the speaker, to provide the speaker with a therapeutic and cathartic
outlet, to educate other participants in the sentencing proceeding, and to en-
hance the perceived fairness of the legal system. At base, the scope of the allocu-
tion right granted to victims at sentencing is broader than the right granted to
defendants. In light of these differences, courts tend to review the denial of a de-
fendant's right to allocute in a more constrained manner than they review the
denial of a victim's right to allocute under the CVRA. The end result is that a
victim's allocution right is more likely to be enforced than a defendant's corol-
lary right. Therefore, despite the fact that the victims' rights movement is predi-
cated, in part, on arguments of fairness and equity, an imbalance exists between
the underlying theories for, and enforcement of, victim and defendant allocu-
tion.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 83 (8th ed. 2004).
10. 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1347 (D. Utah 2005).
11. 435 F.3d ion, l1o6 (9th Cir. 2006); see also, e.g., Richard A. Bierschbach, Allocution
and the Purposes of Victim Participation Under the CVRA, 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 44,
46-47 (2006) (discussing the Kenna I and Degenhardt cases as seeking to treat "vic-
tims as equals with the other main players in the criminal process"); Amy Baron-
Evans, Traps for the Unwary Under the Crime Victims' Rights Act: Lessons from the
Kenna Cases, 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 49, 51-52 (2006) (questioning whether the vic-
tim's right to be reasonably heard includes the right to relitigate, as the functional
equivalent of a party, a defendant's sentence).
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This incongruity should give victims' rights advocates a measure of pause.
If advocates really do want to create more balance and equity between the
treatment of victims and defendants at sentencing, the disconnect between the
two practices should not be overlooked. The failure to acknowledge this dis-
connect, as well as the failure to appeal for some form of readjustment, makes
victims' advocates calls for balance and equality in the criminal justice system
ring somewhat hollow.
Perhaps advocates should concede that they have been too successful in
their efforts and should consider narrowing the victim's allocution right so that
it is more in line with the defendant's right. However, curtailing victim allocu-
tion so that it more closely mirrors defendant allocution is not the only way to
address the imbalance between the two practices. Instead, I contend that the
theories and purposes underlying victim allocution can be equally applied to
defendant allocution, thereby expanding the scope and practice of the defen-
dant's right. By construing the rite of allocution broadly for both victims and
defendants, our criminal justice system may come closer to finding a true bal-
ance between the allocution right of victims and of defendants.12
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the history of the victims' rights
movement and examines the role that the fairness and equality arguments have
played in advancing victims' rights. It also outlines the basic structure of the
CVRA, its enforcement mechanisms, and the sentencing rights it affords to vic-
tims. Part II examines how courts have thus far addressed victim allocution un-
der the CVRA. That Part identifies two theories that advance the practice-a
relevancy theory and a rite-based theory-but concludes that the rite-based
theory seems to predominate in justifying the right's existence. Part III exam-
ines the history and practice of defendant allocution, topics which have received
only scant scholarly attention over the past sixty years. The examination reveals
that, in contrast to victim allocution, defendant allocution is justified primarily
by the mitigating effect it may have on a defendant's sentence. Its practice and
enforcement, therefore, tend to be far narrower than the practice and enforce-
ment of victim allocution. Finally, Part IV addresses this imbalance and advo-
cates a reconceptualization of defendant allocution that would allow both vic-
tims and defendants to benefit from the transformative nature of the ritual of
allocution.
I. VICTIMS' RIGHTS AND THE CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT
A. Victims' Rights and Arguments for Equality
The Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) 3 is the most recent manifestation
of a decades-old movement that has sought to respond to victims' needs in the
criminal justice system. Some of the earliest efforts of the victims' rights move-
12. See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934).
13. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (West 2007).
436
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ment trace as far back as the mid-1960s.14 However, victims' rights became a
firmly established topic of national debate with the 1982 release of the Presi-
dent's Task Force on Victims of Crime Final Report.' The Task Force, established
in early 1982 by President Ronald Reagan, was commissioned to "conduct a re-
view of national, state and local policies and programs affecting victims of
crime,"'6 and to "advise the President and Attorney General with respect to ac-
tions which can be undertaken to improve... efforts to assist and protect vic-
tims of crime."'" Its Final Report provided a disturbing account of how victims
were treated by the criminal justice system and how such treatment was often
perceived by victims to be far worse than the treatment they suffered at the
hands of the offender.8
The Final Report invoked themes of equality and fairness in calling for the
criminal justice system to change how it responds to victims. The Final Report
claimed that when victims take the brave and socially responsible step to report
the crimes committed against them,
they find little protection. They discover instead that they will be
treated as appendages of a system appallingly out of balance. They learn
that somewhere along the way the system has lost track of the simple
14. See, e.g., Frank Carrington & George Nicholson, The Victim's Movement: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 2 & n.3 (1984) (discussing California's
passage in 1965 of the first victims' compensation legislation); Sue Anna Moss Cel-
lini, The Proposed Victims' Rights Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States: Opening the Door of the Criminal Justice System to the Victim, 14 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMp. L. 839, 853 (1997); Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the
Criminal justice Process: Fifteen Years After the President's Task Force on Victims of
Crime, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 21, 28-30 (1999).
15. For the remainder of this Article, I will refer to this source as the Final Report.
16. Exec. Order No. 12,360, 3 C.F.R. 181 (1982).
17. Id.
18. TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 12-13. Advocates express concern that victims suffer a
second phase of victimization in the course of reporting crimes and attempting to
navigate their way through the criminal justice process. See, e.g., Senate Floor
Statements in Support of the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 1O5 CONG. REC. S46o, S4 269
(daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl), reprinted in 19 FED. SENT'G REP.
62, 64 (2006) [hereinafter April 2004 Senate Floor Statements]; DOUGLAS E. BE-
LOOP ET AL., VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 20 (2d ed. 2006); Douglas E. Be-
loof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation Model, 1999
UTAH L. REV. 289, 293-98; Edna Erez, Victim Voice, Impact Statements and Sen-
tencing: Integrating Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence Principles in
Adversarial Proceedings, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 483 (2004); Kyl et al., supra note 6, at
613; Ilyssa Wellikoff, Note, Victim-Offender Mediation and Violent Crimes: On the
Way to Justice, 5 CARDOZO ONLINE I. CONFLICT RESOL. 2 (2004), http://www.
cojcr.org/vol5nol/noteo2.html. Affording victims more participatory rights in the
criminal justice process is seen as one means by which to diminish secondary vic-
timization.
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
truth that it is supposed to be fair and protect those who obey the law
while punishing those who break it. Somewhere along the way, the sys-
tem began to serve lawyers and judges and defendants, treating the vic-
tim with institutionalized disinterest. '9
In expressing further concern regarding the treatment of victims, the Final
Report claimed, "A system that fails to be equitable cannot survive. The system
was designed to be the fairest in history, but it has lost the balance that has been
the cornerstone of its wisdom."2
The imbalance that exists between victims and defendants is rooted within
the public prosecution model, which generally structures how our country ad-
dresses crime." For most of our nation's history, crime has been viewed not as a
harm suffered by private individuals at the hands of others, but as a violation
"which tears at the fabric of our peace and community and hence creates a
harm that is greater than simply the harm to the victim involved."22 The public
prosecution model emphasizes that certain wrongs so violate the norms of ap-
propriate behavior in civil society that the power of the state should be brought
to bear against individuals violating those norms. By conceiving of crime as acts
that harm not only individual victims, but also all members of our body of or-
dered government, the state assumes the duties of prosecution and punishment,
thereby relieving victims of the personal responsibility of holding perpetrators
liable for their criminal acts.2 3 However, the public prosecution model focuses
on the relationship between the state and the offender, rather than the victim
and the offender, and has therefore relegated victims to the roles of witnesses or
of evidence. Institutional consideration of victims' individual harms has be-
come secondary to the state's primary goals of deterring and punishing criminal
activity.
24
19. TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at vi.
20. Id. at 16.
21. For discussion of the transformation of the American criminal justice system
from a private to public prosecution model, see Richard Barajas & Scott Alexander
Nelson, The Proposed Crime Victims' Federal Constitutional Amendment: Working
Toward a Proper Balance, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 8-11 (1997); Beloof & Cassell, supra
note 6, at 484-503; Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 357, 366-72 (1986); Cellini, supra note 14, at 842-50; Wil-
liam F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Re-
turn of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649, 651-65 (1976); and Tobolowsky, supra
note 14, at 24-28.
22. Twist, supra note 6, at 369-71.
23. Under the private prosecution model, which predominated in earlier manifesta-
tions of our criminal justice system, victims bore the responsibility of prosecuting
the defendant, as well as financing his incarceration. See McDonald, supra note 21,
at 651-54 (describing the victim's duties under the private prosecution model of
criminal justice).
24. Cardenas, supra note 21, at 371-72.
438
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Victims' rights advocates have emphasized this imperfection of the public
prosecution model by pointing out that "while criminal defendants have an ar-
ray of rights under law,"25 "victims, and their families, [are] ignored, cast
aside .... treated as non-participants in a critical event in their lives, " 6 and
granted few rights or protections throughout the criminal justice process. Vic-
tims' rights laws, including the CVRA, seek to alter this seeming imbalance.
Victims' rights advocates argue that the "criminal justice system ... can and
should care about both the rights of the accused and the rights of victims,""7
and that a legal system which provides victims "with participatory rights is not
only what the law requires but also the right course in providing justice for all.
Once victims' rights are accepted as the rule of law to be followed, our federal
criminal justice system will, in fact, be more just.2"
The equal rights argument for expanding victims' rights has not escaped
criticism. First, one must acknowledge that victims and defendants are not and
cannot be treated as absolute equals in the criminal justice process. The defen-
dant has a vital interest in being present and heard throughout the criminal
process that cannot be matched by the victim. Unlike defendants, victims do
not face the potential of having their liberty, property, or lives taken from them
by the government. Skeptics have also expressed concern that the call for equal-
ity between victims and defendants is really a screen behind which those dis-
dainful of defendants' broad constitutional rights can seek to undermine
them.2 9
25. April 2004 Senate Floor Statements, supra note 18, at 63 (statement of Sen. Fein-
stein). During the 196os, the Warren Court greatly expanded defendants' rights.
See, e.g., Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court
and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518; Cellini, supra note 14, at 849; Lynne
N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 942-48 (1985);
Thad H. Westbrook, At Least Treat Us Like Criminals!: South Carolina Responds to
Victims' Pleas for Equal Rights, 49 S.C. L. REV. 575, 579-80 (1998). Key decisions
from that era included Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which com-
manded that the police inform individuals under arrest of their rights prior to in-
terrogation; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1964), which mandated that indi-
gent defendants be afforded government-funded counsel; and Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), which established the exclusionary rule.
26. April 2004 Senate Floor Statements, supra note 18, at 63 (statement of Sen. Fein-
stein).
27. Id.
28. Russell P. Butler, What Practitioners and Judges Need To Know Regarding Crime
Victims' Participatory Rights in Federal Sentencing Proceedings, 19 FED. SENT'G REP.
21, 22 (2OO6); see also, e.g., Twist, supra note 6, at 372 ("A justice system that af-
fords its only rights to accused and convicted offenders, but preserves and pro-
tects none for its crime victims, has lost its essential balance. Moreover, such a
system continues to lose the public's confidence and its claim to respect.").
29. Erin Ann O'Hara, Victim Participation in the Criminal Process, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 229,
242-43 (2005); see Michael M. O'Hear, Punishment, Democracy, and Victims, 19
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An equality or fairness argument is also tenuous because it is often predi-
cated on a not-entirely-realistic dichotomy of the "good victim" and the "bad
defendant."" In arguing for increased victims' rights, the Final Report capital-
ized on the image of the blameless victim and nefarious defendant. In compar-
ing victims and defendants, the Final Report commented that "[t] he defendant's
every right has been protected, and now he serves his time in a public facility,
receiving education at public expense. In a few months his sentence will have
run. Victims receive sentences too; their sentences may be life long."31 The Final
Report also suggested that for those victims who follow the perpetrator's pro-
gress through the court system:
[Y]ou reflect on how you and your victimizer were treated by the sys-
tem that is called justice. You are aware of inequities that are more than
merely procedural. During trial and after sentencing the defendant had
a free lawyer; he was fed and housed; given physical and psychiatric
treatment, job training, education, support for his family, counsel on
appeal. Although you do not oppose any of these safeguards, you real-
ize that you have helped to pay for all these benefits for the criminal.
Now, in addition and by yourself, you must try to repair all that his
crime has destroyed; and what you cannot repair, you must endure.3
Such language may justly lead one to feel great sympathy for crime victims.
However, the image of the good victim and bad defendant is not as tidy as the
Final Report implies. The mob member who gets shot during a dispute and the
batterer who drives his partner to retaliatory violence are crime victims, just as
is the old man who is mugged or the teenager who is raped.3 Similarly, some
defendants do not so easily fit the "bad defendant" model. At one extreme, the
innocent defendant defies this model. Likewise, it seems inaccurate to charac-
terize the foolish, misled, or mere accomplice defendant as unequivocally
"bad." Nonetheless, by emphasizing the good victim/bad defendant construct, a
call for victims' rights can be easily transformed into a zero-sum game in which
it is easy to conceive of granting greater rights to the more morally deserving of
the two parties.
3 4
An equal participation or fairness model justifying victims' rights may also
insufficiently address some legitimate concerns that victims have regarding
their treatment by the criminal justice system, as well as their victimization in
FED. SENT'G REP. 1, 2-3 (2006); see also Henderson, supra note 25, at 951 (address-
ing the "conservative bent" of victims' rights movements).
30. Michael M. O'Hear, Victims and Criminal Justice: What's Next?, 19 FED. SENT'G
REP. 83, 83-84, 87 (20o6).
31. TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 11.
32. Id. at 13.
33. See, e.g., Lynne Henderson, Revisiting Victim's Rights, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 383, 404;
Henderson, supra note 25, at 951.
34. See O'Hear, supra note 29, at 1-2; O'Hear, supra note 30, at 86.
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general.35 Certainly, victims often desire to be notified of, observe, and partici-
pate in the trial for the crime committed against them to the same extent that is
granted to the defendant. However, victims may have any number of other in-
terests that are not as easily matched or balanced against the defendant's rights.
These include interests in "financial reparations, apology, mediated victim-
offender dialogue, protection of identity and personal privacy, psychological
counseling, and protective or rehabilitative measures to prevent revictimiza-
tion." 6 Hence, an equal rights justification for victims' rights is not and cannot
be all encompassing.
Despite these legitimate criticisms, the argument for equal treatment of vic-
tims has been highly effective in establishing victims' expanded role in the
criminal justice system and remains a prevalent theme in justifying victims'
rights. Since the Final Report was issued in 1982, almost every state has passed
some form of victims' rights legislation, 7 and over thirty states have passed
amendments to their state constitutions granting rights to victims." Similarly,
35. See O'Hear, supra note 30, at 86.
36. Id.
37. State statutes have provided victims with the right to be informed of the status of
their case and the defendant's confinement. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.61.olo(a)(2)-(3) (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 679.03 (West 1999); IND. CODE
§ 35-40-5-8 (Supp. 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1844(A) (1999 & Supp. 2008);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-36-5 (1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-26-4 (Michie 1978); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530 (Supp. 2007); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.08,
56.11-.12 (Vernon Supp. 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 64-13-14.7(2) to (4), 77-38-3
(2004). State statutes have also provided victims with the right to be heard at any
proceeding involving sentencing or post-conviction release decisions. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 15-23-74 (1995); FLA. STAT. § 96o.oo1(1)(a)(5) (2006); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 99-36-5(1)(e) (1999); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.02(a)(5)
(Vernon 2006 & Supp. 2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.69.030(13) (2007).
38. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 557; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 2.1; COLO. CONST. art 2,
§ 16a; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 16(b); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1; LA. CONST. art. I, § 25;
MICH. CONST. art 1, § 24; Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 32; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 8; N.M.
CONST. art II, § 24; OHIO CONST. art. I, § loa; OR. CONST. art. 1, § 42; TEX. CONST.
art. 1, § 30; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35. Many of the state
amendments grant victims the right to be treated with fairness and promise that a
victim's right to justice and due process will be protected. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST.
art. 2, § 2.1(a); CONN. CONST. amend. art. XXIX, § b; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 22(1);
N.J. CONST. art. I, p. 22; OHIO CONST. art. I, § ioa; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35. It
must be noted however, that a number of the state victims' rights amendments
limit the rights granted to victims by providing that a victim's rights cannot ex-
ceed a defendant's constitutionally protected rights and cannot serve as the basis
to set aside, reverse, or vacate the result of a criminal proceeding. See, e.g., CONN.
CONST. amend. art. XXIX, § b; IDAHO CONST. Art. I, § 22; OHIO CONST. art. I,
§ io(a); Wis. CONST. art. I, § 9m.
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on the federal level, Congress has passed numerous pieces of victims' rights leg-
islation, 9 the most recent of which is the CVRA.
B. The Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA)
The CVRA provides victims of federal crimes the right to be present and
reasonably heard at any public court or parole proceeding, 40 including sentenc-
ing proceedings.4 ' The CVRA further vests victims with standing to challenge
violations of their rights through the writ of mandamus. Normally, the writ is
viewed as an extraordinary remedy granted only under very specific circum-
stances. 42 However, by directing that courts "shall take up and decide" any mo-
tion filed by a victim, the CVRA eliminates the discretionary nature of manda-
mus relief and instead requires a court to consider every victim's complaint.
43
Pursuant to the statute, a victim must first assert her rights "in the district court
in which the defendant is being prosecuted for the crime, or if there is no prose-
cution underway, in the district court in the district where the crime oc-
curred. '44 The district court must address the victim's claim, and if the claim is
39. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (West 2007). Previously passed federal victims' rights legislation
includes the Victim Rights Clarification Act of 1997, 18 U.S.C. § 3510 (2000), the
Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § lO,6O6 (2000), the Victims
of Crime Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 1o,6o1 (2000), and the Victim and Witness Pro-
tection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982).
40. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(3)-(4) (West 2007). A victim can only be excluded from
these proceedings if a court decides, based on clear and convincing evidence, that
any testimony the victim might provide would be materially altered by other in-
formation the victim might hear at the proceeding. Id. § 3771(a)(3).
41. Id. § 3771(a)(4). The 1982 President's Task Force on Victims of Violent Crime Final
Report significantly advanced the argument for victim allocution at sentencing,
recommending in part that victims be permitted to present impact statements.
TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 18, 33; see also supra note 37 (listing state statutes
granting victims the right to be heard at sentencing and post-conviction release
proceedings). The Supreme Court's decision in Payne v. Tennessee further legiti-
mized the presence of victims at sentencing and their presentation of impact evi-
dence, albeit as witnesses for the state. 501 U.S. 808 (1991); see also infra notes 58-
6o and accompanying text (discussing the role of victim statements at sentencing
in capital trials).
42. See Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court (Kenna 1), 435 F.3d lo11, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006); Senate
Floor Statement in Support of the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 150 CONG. REC. S1O91
(daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl), reprinted in 19 FED. SENT'G REP.
69, 72 (2OO6) [hereinafter October 2004 Senate Floor Statement].
43. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(3) (West 2007) (emphasis added); see also Kenna 1, 435 F.3d
at 1o17; In re Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 2005); Kyl et al., su-
pra note 6, at 618; October 2004 Senate Floor Statement, supra note 42, at 72.
44. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(3) (West 2007).
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denied, the victim may petition the court of appeals for review. 45 The CVRA
provides a streamlined procedure by which a single judge of the appropriate
court of appeals can review the victim's petition for the writ of mandamus, and
directs the court to issue a decision within seventy-two hours after the petition
is filed.46 If the court denies the victim's request for relief, the court is required
to issue a written opinion clearly stating its reasons for doing so.
4 7
The CVRA does place some limits on a victim's request for relief. First, vio-
lation of a victim's rights under the statute does not authorize the victim to seek
a new trial of the defendant.4s Similarly, if a victim is denied her right to be
heard at sentencing or any other appropriate proceeding, the victim can file a
motion to reopen the plea or sentence only where she
asserted the right to be heard before or during the proceeding at issue
and such right was denied; the victim petition[ed] the court of appeals
for a writ of mandamus within io days; and in the case of a plea, the ac-
cused [did] not [plea] to the highest offense charged.
49
The statute also dictates that "[i]n no event shall proceedings be stayed or sub-
ject to a continuance of more than five days for purposes of enforcing this chap-
ter."5 Presumably, this time limit and the seventy-two hour constraint placed
on the courts of appeal guard against placing the defendant in a state of limbo
in terms of entering a plea, arguing for pre-trial release, or proceeding to sen-
tencing.
In summary, the CVRA, along with the state and federal statutes that pre-
ceded it, seeks to ensure that victims are no longer silent Victorian children
within the criminal justice system.' Instead, the CVRA establishes victims as
independent participants, distinct from the government, in the administration
of criminal justice.5" The scope of that independence, and arguments for sup-
porting the victim's expanded role, however, should be subject to additional ex-
amination. The sentencing rights granted to victims under the CVRA comprise
one area in which to assess whether, and to what extent, victims' independent




48. Id. § 3771(d)( 5 ).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 3771(d)( 3).
51. Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court (Kenna I), 435 F. 3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 20o6).
52. See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
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II. VICTIM ALLOCUTION UNDER THE CVRA
A. The Goals of Victim Allocution
Since passage of the CVRA in 2004, courts have already begun to examine
the scope of victim allocution rights under the statute. Kenna I,53 United States
v. Degenhardt,4 and United States v. Marcello55 provide a snapshot of the current
status of victim sentencing participation under the CVRA. This small but grow-
ing body of case law highlights that victim allocution exists to serve a variety of
purposes. These purposes include:
(i) to permit the victim to regain a sense of dignity and respect rather
than feeling powerless and ashamed; (2) to require defendants to con-
front-in person and not just on paper-the human consequences of
their illegal conduct; and (3) to compel courts to fully account in the
sentencing process for the serious societal harms [of crime.] 6
More simply, one could describe these three goals as (I) empowering the victim,
(2) educating the defendant, and (3) informing the court.
These three goals are supported by two distinct theories. The relevancy the-
ory centers on the impact that victim allocution statements have on the calcula-
tion of the defendant's sentence. The rite-based theory focuses on the ritualistic
power of standing before a court and expressing one's views. This latter theory
addresses, in part, the relationship created between a victim and a defendant as
a result of the defendant's criminal acts. By allowing the victim to participate in
the ritual of speaking in court, the victim is provided with the opportunity to
alter that relationship through personal empowerment and education of the de-
fendant. Both the relevancy and rite-based theories for victim allocution are
evident in how courts have thus far applied the CVRA. However, I contend that
the rite-based theory better accounts for how courts describe, apply, and up-
hold the victim's right to be heard at sentencing.
7
53. 435 F.3d lol; see also In re Kenna (Kenna 11), 453 F.3d 1136 (9 th Cir. 2006) (per cu-
riam) (deciding the companion case to Kenna I in which the victim sought unfet-
tered access to the defendant's presentence report).
54. 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (D. Utah 2005).
55. 370 F. Supp. 2d 745 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
56. Jayne W. Barnard, Allocution for Victims of Economic Crimes, 77 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 39, 41 (2001); see also Kenna 1, 435 F.3d at 1o16 (citing Barnard, supra); Degen-
hardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1348 (same); Bierschbach, supra note 11, at 45-47 (discuss-
ing purported goals of victim allocution); Erez, supra note 18, at 484 (same).
57. In her article, Beyond Mitigation: Towards a Theory of Allocution, Professor Kim-
berly Thomas engages in a similar analysis regarding the theories for defendant al-
locution. Kimberly A. Thomas, Beyond Mitigation: Towards a Theory of Allocution,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2641, 2643-44 (2007). Thomas identifies a mitigation theory
and a humanization theory underlying defendant allocution. Id. Her work is par-
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B. A Relevancy Theory for Victim Allocution
When one reviews the purposes for victim allocution, the last articulated
purpose-informing the court-nicely furthers the relevancy theory for victim
allocution. The theory proffers that a core justification for victim allocution
centers on the victim's contribution to the sentencing outcome. In essence, vic-
tims should be granted the right to allocute because their statements relate to
the court's determination of the appropriate sentence for the defendant. Sena-
tor Kyl, a sponsor of the CVRA, highlighted this relevancy theme when he
stated that the content of victim allocution should include "all three types of
victim impact: the character of the victim, the impact of the crime on the vic-
tim, the victim['s] family and the community, and sentencing recommenda-
tions.""s These three categories of victim sentencing information define the tra-
ditionally acceptable content for victim impact statements (VIS), a closely
aligned but distinguishable practice from the broader victim sentencing rights
provided by the CVRA.
With VIS, the victim traditionally testifies as a witness, generally for the
state. What the victim can say is limited by evidentiary rules and is subject to
constitutional challenge in capital cases. 59 In contrast, when a victim exercises
her right to be reasonably heard at sentencing under the CVRA, she is not act-
ing as a witness. The victim's act of speaking is an individual choice, separate
from any decision of the state or defense. The victim also has greater latitude to
express opinions independent of and contrary to those presented by the gov-
ticularly relevant to my analysis of the current practice of defendant allocution.
See infra Section IV.B.
58. October 2004 Senate Floor Statement, supra note 42, at 70 (statement of Sen. Kyl);
see also April 2004 Senate Floor Statements, supra note 18, at 64 (statement of Sen.
Feinstein) (indicating that victims should be able to provide "any information, as
well as their opinion ... concerning the ... sentencing of the accused").
59. VIS has received the most attention in the context of capital sentencing. In Payne
v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), the Supreme Court held that a state's use of VIS
at sentencing did not per se violate a defendant's rights under the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 827. But see id. at 831 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting
that VIS should be excluded where they are unduly inflammatory). As the post-
Payne case law has evolved, three major categories of victim impact statements are
regularly received. See, e.g., United States v. Sampson, 332 F. Supp. 2d 325, 338 (D.
Mass. 2004) (noting that VIS has become a "regular, legitimate feature" of federal
capital trials). These categories are as follows: (i) statements regarding the nature
of the victim, (2) statements regarding the emotional impact of the crime, and (3)
statements regarding the victim's opinion of the nature of the defendant's actions,
as well as the victim's opinion about the appropriate sentence for the defendant.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text. In the context of non-capital cases, it is
generally accepted that all three types of VIS are acceptable. See, e.g., Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507 n.io, 509 n.12 (1987), overruled in part by Payne, 501
U.S. 808; George v. Angelone, loo F.3d 353, 359-60 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Santana, 908 F.2d 506, 507 (9th Cir. 199o); Kyl et al., supra note 6, at 608.
445
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
ernment, which might include expressing forgiveness or mercy or pleading for a
shorter sentence for the defendant.60
In this regard and under the CVRA, victims have been deemed "independ-
ent participants" in the criminal process. 6' However, victims' status as inde-
pendent participants under the CVRA has not transformed them into parties or
even quasi-litigants. In In re Kenna (Kenna II),62 the court rejected the victim's
argument that his right to be reasonably heard under the CVRA included the
right to litigate, as a party, the calculation of the defendant's sentence. 61 Nor
does the CVRA put a victim in a position ahead of the defendant or the state by
permitting him to "present evidence for the first time at the sentencing hearing
under the guise of unsworn allocution. ' '6 4 But however one defines the victim's
60. See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology
into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 141 (2004); Bierschbach, supra note ii, at
45-47; Erez, supra note 18, at 497-98; Andrew J. Karmen, Who's Against Victims'
Rights? The Nature of the Opposition to Pro- Victim Initiatives in Criminal Justice, 8
ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 157, 162 (1992); Tobolowsky, supra note 14, at 84-
85.
61. Kenna I, 435 F. 3d at 1o13; October 2004 Senate Floor Statement, supra note 42, at 70
(statement of Sen. Kyl); Douglas E. Beloof, Judicial Leadership at Sentencing Under
the Crime Victims' Rights Act: Judge Kozinski in Kenna and Judge Cassell in Degen-
hardt, 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 36, 37-38 (2006) [hereinafter Beloof, Judicial Leader-
ship]; Paul G. Cassell, Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure: Proposed Amendments in Light of the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 2005 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 835, 852. In attempting to provide some meaning to the phrase "independ-
ent participant," Professor Douglas Beloof, a leading scholar and advocate for vic-
tims' rights, has suggested the phrase should be defined as a "crime victim with
rights of intermittent participation in the criminal process." Douglas E. Beloof,
Constitutional Implications of Crime Victims as Participants, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
282, 286 (2003) [hereinafter Beloof, Constitutional Implications]. However, as
noted above, the right of victims to "intermittent participation in the criminal
process" has not transformed victims into full litigating parties. See infra notes 62-
65 and accompanying text.
62. 453 F. 3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); see also Baron-Evans, supra note 11, at
51-53 (discussing In re Kenna and noting that the victim in that case argued that
his right to be reasonably heard included access to the defendant's presentence re-
port so that the victim could present arguments at resentencing regarding the cal-
culation of the defendant's sentence).
63. Id. at 1137; see also Matthew B. Riley, Note, Victim Participation in the Criminal
Justice System: In re Kenna and Victim Access to Presentence Reports, 2007 UTAH L.
REv. 235, 250 (discussing the In re Kenna decision and noting that while the CVRA
may seek to make victims full participants in the criminal justice system, they are
not treated as absolute equals with the prosecution and the defense).
64. Baron-Evans, supra note ii, at 51.
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participatory rights, the victim's status as an independent participant provides
him with the autonomy to decide whether or not to speak at sentencing."
Despite the differences between traditional VIS and victims' allocution
rights under the CVRA, Senator Kyl's reference to VIS as an analogue to victim
CVRA allocution strongly implies that a victim's statement should be relevant
to the court's sentencing determination. Extrapolating from the VIS context,
courts tend to view the three categories of victim impact evidence cited by the
CVRA's authors as means to inform "the sentencing authority about the spe-
cific harm caused by the crime in question,"66 and thereby aid the court in
reaching a sentencing outcome.
Cases interpreting victims' CVRA sentencing rights highlight this relevancy
theme. For example, in United States v. Marcello, the court addressed a victim's
analogous right under the CVRA to be reasonably heard at the pre-trial re-
lease/detention hearing of two defendants charged with murder." The Marcello
court indicated that the son of the murder victim did not have the absolute
right to speak in open court because the content of the son's statement was not
material to the court's release decision.6" The court stated that, in making its de-
cision whether to release the defendants, it was required to consider the
strength of the case against the defendants, the seriousness of the crime with
which the defendants were charged, and "the reasonable apprehension of per-
sonal danger to the victim. '"6 There was no question that the crimes with which
the defendants were charged were serious, and the son made no claim that he
would be at risk if the defendants were released. According to the court, the
only potential information the son could provide related to the strength of the
case against the defendants. The court determined that the son was in no posi-
tion to offer an opinion on this matter, especially since the alleged murder had
occurred twenty years earlier.7" Therefore, the court concluded that it was not
required to hear from the son.7
65. Kenna 1, 435 F.3d at 1013, 1o16; United States v. Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d at
1344; October 2004 Senate Floor Statement, supra note 42, at 70; Beloof, Judicial
Leadership, supra note 61, at 37-38.
66. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 8o8, 825 (1991).
67. 370 F. Supp. 2d 745, 746-50 (N.D. Ill. 2005). While addressing an issue distinct
from the victim's right to be heard at sentencing, the Marcello court's analysis is
nonetheless relevant in that it examined the portion of the CVRA which grants
victims both the right to be heard at pre-trial release hearings and at sentencing
proceedings. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(4) (West 2007) (giving victims the "right to
be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving re-
lease, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding").
68. 370 F. Supp. 2d at 747.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 747 & n.5.
71. Id. at 748.
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In the course of reaching its conclusion, however, the court indicated that
its ruling should not be interpreted to wholly preclude a victim's right to be
heard at sentencing. Indeed, the court strongly suggested that, in the context of
sentencing,
the policy of hearing the victim is wise .... [I]n a moral sense, [the vic-
tim is] a party to the case and... should always be given the opportu-
nity to testify at all sentencing hearings and some bond hearings....
[This is due to the] likelihood that the victim's statements would be
material and relevant to the issue before the court.
72
The court further opined that victim "statements will (at least in sentence and
prison release hearings) almost always be relevant, material and spoken from
[the victim's] personal knowledge."73 However, the court was unwilling to rule
that § 3771(d)(4) requires that victims have the opportunity to speak to the
court in all instances. Instead, the court limited the victim's right to speak by
focusing on the materiality and relevancy of what the victim had to offer.
Hence, according to the Marcello court, a victim should be guaranteed only the
right to contribute information to the sentencing process that could affect the
outcome of the proceeding.
7 4
In Kenna I, the relevancy of a victim's allocution statement was also ad-
dressed. There, father and son defendants "swindled scores of victims out of
almost soo million."75 At the father's sentencing hearing, several victims pre-
sented written impact statements, and Mr. Kenna, another victim, spoke to the
court regarding the effect the defendants' crimes had on him. Three months
later, the son was sentenced, and Mr. Kenna again sought to exercise his CVRA
rights at sentencing. The trial court denied his request, stating:
I listened to the victims the last time... and, quite frankly, I don't
think there's anything that any victim could say that would have any
impact whatsoever.... [W]hat can you say when people have lost their
life savings and what can you say when the individual who testified last
time put his client's [sic] into this investment and millions and mil-
lions of dollars and ended up losing his business? There just isn't any-
thing else that could possibly be said.7
6
72. Id. at 746 n.2.
73. Id. at 750 (emphasis added).
74. Id. The CVRA also directs that where a victim is denied the right to be reasonably
heard at a plea hearing, the victim cannot seek to reopen that proceeding if the
defendant entered a plea to the highest crime charged. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(5)(C)
(West 2007). The implication and assumption here is that the victim would wish
to speak against the defendant entering a plea to a lower offense, but would have
nothing relevant to offer or contribute to the proceeding if the defendant entered
a plea to the highest offense charged.
75. Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court (Kenna 1), 435 F.3d 1011, 1012 (9th Cir. 2006).
76. Id. at 1013 (quoting the district court's explanation).
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The trial court seemed to indicate that there was no need to hear Mr. Kenna be-
cause nothing he could say would make a difference to the judge's sentencing
determination. Many of the victims had already spoken or addressed the court
in written form at the father's sentencing hearing, and according to the trial
court, this was sufficient.
The trial court's ruling was reversed on appeal. The appellate court empha-
sized that it was important for a sentencing court to hear from a victim so that
the victim could assist the court in determining the defendant's sentence by
sharing information as to how the defendant's actions harmed the victim. 7 In
particular, any number of harms could have developed between the father's
sentencing hearing and the son's sentencing hearing, and the victim had a right
to inform the court of those harms." The appellate court emphasized that, in
order for the district court to render a sentence for the defendant, it must "con-
sider the effects of the crime on the victims at the time it makes its decision with
respect to punishment, not as they were at some point in the past."79 The court
therefore remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
C. A Rite-Based Theory for Victim Allocution
A relevancy theory alone, however, cannot account for the other proffered
purposes of victim allocution under the CVRA. The goals of empowering the
victim and morally educating the defendant have very little bearing on the cal-
culation of the defendant's sentence. Instead, these additional goals reveal that
victim allocution is also important because it focuses on the relationship created
between the victim and the defendant as the result of the defendant's criminal
acts, and seeks-through the ritual of the victim speaking before the court-to
change that relationship. Here, the additional goals of victim allocution are
supported by a rite-based theory, which focuses on the transformative value
that the ritual of sentencing allocution provides to the victim.
A growing body of scholarship addresses the connection between informal
social norms, such as rituals, and the influence such practices have on our for-
mal legal constructs."s Generally, rituals are employed to maintain the political
77. Id. at 16.
78. Id. at 1016-17.
79. Id.
80. OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW, CULTURE, AND RITUAL: DISPUTING SYSTEMS IN CROSS-
CULTURAL CONTEXT (2005); Andrew J. Cappel, Bringing Cultural Practice into
Law: Ritual and Social Norms Jurisprudence, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 389, 389-90
nn.1-2 (2003) (listing scholarship); Geoffrey Miller, The Legal Function of Ritual,
8o CHI.-KENT L. REV. n81, 1181-82 & nn.2-3 (same) (2005); see also Mark Cam-
mack, Evidence Rules and the Ritual Functions of Trials: "Saying Something of
Something," 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 783, 788-91 (1992) (discussing the ritualistic na-
ture of trials); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the
Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971) (expressing concern that the utilization
of mathematical methods in the conduct of trials and in designing procedures for
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power of our government systems and bring legitimacy to other equally impor-
tant social structures."s For example, most people begin long-term relationships
with a wedding or commitment ceremony, acknowledge a shift in authority
through inaugurations and installations, and reinforce their patriotism through
the reciting of the Pledge of Allegiance.2 Likewise, the structured, repetitive,
and ceremonial aspects of a trial undergird its legitimacy as this country's pri-
mary method of dispute resolution."s
The ritual of trial begins with the call of "all rise" and is finalized with the
pounding of the judge's gavel. Between these two distinct moments, the trial
participants engage in a series of ceremonial procedures that resemble a dra-
matic performance. The overseer of the drama wears the costume of a black
robe and must be addressed using such official titles as "Judge," "Your Honor,"
and "May it please the court." The trial occurs in a defined space-the court-
room-that is designed to further the authority and gravitas of the events that
occur in its arena. For example, the judge is placed above the trial participants
on her "bench." Likewise, jurors and witnesses have designated physical spaces,
or "boxes," where they sit during the ritual, and they cannot perform their du-
ties without first taking an oath. Additionally, the jury and their deliberations
are treated with an aspect of ritual and ceremony. They retreat from the court-
room to discuss in private their determination of guilt or innocence, only then
to return to the open forum to pronounce their verdict. At this momentous
part of the ritual, all present in the room are again commanded to rise upon the
jury's entry s 4 The final call of "all rise" upon the jury's reentry signals that this
ritual, whose curtain rose with the same invocation, will soon conclude.
This ritual of the criminal trial represents a "dramatization of the values of
our spiritual government."" 5 The state is dignified as the enforcer of the law,
while the defendant is dignified as a challenger of the state, whether he is a dis-
senter, radical, or criminal. 6 The trial's participants-judge, defendant, victim,
witness, and jury-serve as conduits to express the ritual's underlying pur-
poses-the determination of guilt and administration of justice.
The regularity and repetition that characterizes ritual "sets [it] apart
from the ordinary course of life, lifts it from the realm of everyday
the trial system as a whole may undermine some of the less calculable but impor-
tant ritualistic aspects of trial procedure and decision making).
81. CHASE, supra note 8o, at 114 (citing DAVID I. KERTZER, RITUAL, POLITICS, AND
POWER 9 (1988)).
82. See Miller, supra note 8o, at 12o8-14 (marriage ceremonies and inaugurations);
Sheldon H. Nahmod, The Pledge as Sacred Political Ritual, 13 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 797 (2005) (Pledge of Allegiance).
83. CHASE, supra note 80, at 114-15.
84. Id. at 117-21.
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practical affairs, and surrounds it with an aura of enlarged impor-
tance." It creates a time and space which is, if not quite sacred, at the
very least emotionally charged
s7
The ritual of trial also allows for individual, social, and societal transforma-
tion. In discussing dispute resolution procedures of the Chagga, a tribe living in
the Mount Kilimanjaro area, Sally Falk Moore noted that by submitting a dis-
pute to the authority of others, the dispute between the parties was transformed
into an affirmation by others."8 "By the end of the judicial process the relative
positions of the disputing parties are altered in relation to one another, in rela-
tion to the tribunal, and in relation to the community the tribunal repre-
sents."' 9 A dispute turns into a ruling; a conflict is transformed into resolution;
an imbalance is righted into balance. So too in the American ritual of the crimi-
nal trial. Even if the trial participants are unwillingly present, as is most likely
the case for the defendant, and perhaps even the victim, they nonetheless come
together "with a transcendent sense of reality and meaning, [and the ritual en-
courages them] to be open to changes in their sense of self."9 '
The transformative nature of the ritual of trial is particularly important
when one examines crime from a relational standpoint. Through the commis-
sion of crime, the defendant's acts place him in a position superior to the indi-
vidual he has harmed.9' The defendant's acts objectify the victim by treating
that person as a means to an end-the commission of the crime-and simulta-
neously indicate his belief that community norms do not apply to him.9 While
others may be bound to follow the law, the offender, by departing from social
norms, emphasizes that he rejects being a part of, and living in relation to, his
community. Crime, then, represents a social and moral imbalance between the
victim, defendant, and society. The legal system, and more specifically, the rit-
ual of trial, seeks to redress this imbalance. 93
87. Cammack, supra note 8o, at 789 (alteration in original) (quoting CLIFFORD
GEERTZ, Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight, in THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURES 412, 448 (1973)).
88. CHASE, supra note 80, at 117 (citing Sally Falk Moore, Selection for Failure in a
Small Social Field: Ritual Concord and Fraternal Strife Among the Chagga, Kiliman-
jaro, 1968-1969, in SYMBOL AND POLITICS IN COMMUNAL IDEOLOGY: CASES AND
QUESTIONS 109 (Sally Falk Moore & Barbara G. Myerhoffeds., 1975)).
89. Moore, supra note 88, at 114.
90. Miller, supra note 80, at 1191.
91. Barnard, supra note 56, at 75; Beloof & Cassell, supra note 6, at 536; Bibas & Bier-
schbach, supra note 60, at 109-12; Lynne Henderson, Commentary, Co-opting
Compassion: The Federal Victim's Rights Amendment, io ST. THOMAS L. REV. 579,
594-95 (1998).
92. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 60, at 109-12.
93. Id. at 111-12; Henderson, supra note 91, at 594-95.
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In granting the victim the opportunity to be heard prior to the pro-
nouncement of the defendant's sentence, the victim gains access to a forum that
directly and individually acknowledges her victimhood.
The moment of sentencing is among the most public, formalized, and
ritualistic parts of a criminal case. By giving victims a clear and unin-
terrupted voice at this moment on par with that of defendants and
prosecutors, a right to allocute signals both society's recognition of vic-
tims' suffering and their importance to the criminal process.
94
Therefore, a victim's impact statement or act of allocution "is not merely a pro-
tocol or procedure to follow but rather a measure that fulfills a need for expres-
sion and an important way to recognize [her] status as victim[]." 95 Through the
rite of allocution, the victim also has an opportunity for transformation, em-
powerment, and healing. The victim may enter the courtroom belittled or ter-
rorized. However, by sharing with the court and defendant how the defendant's
actions impacted her, the victim can begin to readjust the moral and social im-
balance between herself and the defendant, and shift from being a victim to be-
ing a survivor.
The ritual of victim allocution also serves to educate the defendant. When
forced to hear directly from the victim, the defendant learns that his actions did
not occur in isolation, and that they have legal as well as moral and emotional
ramifications. 96
The victim is ideally placed to sensitize the offender to the conse-
quences of the crime .... Because both victims and offenders are nei-
ther part of the legal profession nor familiar with its legal jargon, a di-
rect appeal by the victim to the offender may be a more effective route
to bring offenders to accepting responsibility.
97
In the best of circumstances, the defendant may feel genuine remorse for his ac-
tions, apologize for them, and set himself upon a new path of redeemed living.
However, even if the defendant remains unrepentant, hearing from the victim
could implant within him seeds of remorse which later may sprout into refor-
mation. Hence, for the victim, as well as perhaps the defendant, the rite of vic-
tim allocution creates an environment where both may be transformed by the
victim's speech. The victim is able to right the imbalance between herself and
the defendant, while the defendant likewise has the opportunity to reframe
94. Bierschbach, supra note ii, at 46; see also Erez, supra note 18, at 488 (citing to re-
search which notes that two-thirds of victims participated at sentencing for thera-
peutic or expressive reasons).
95. Erez, supra note 18, at 492. Professor Erez's research also indicates that victims
value the opportunity to participate at sentencing because their status as victims is
recognized in the official forum of the courts.
96. See id. at 496-97.
97. Id.
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himself in light of learning directly from the victim about how his choices im-
pacted her.
This rite-based approach to victim allocution has been embraced by courts
interpreting the CVRA. Courts emphasize, sometimes in the very same deci-
sions that invoke the relevancy theme, that permitting victims to engage in the
rite of allocution is important regardless of the relevance of the victim's state-
ment to the court's sentencing decision. For example, in United States v. Degen-
hardt, the court indicated that
even if a victim has nothing to say that would directly alter the court's
sentence, a chance to speak still serves important purposes. As the First
Circuit has pithily explained, "allocution is both a rite and a right."
Part of the rite is a chance for the participants... to have their say be-
fore sentence is imposed. That process is short-circuited if one of the
participants-the victim-is denied an opportunity to speak.9s
Similarly, in Kenna I, the court stated that victim allocution is important be-
cause the victim should have the opportunity to "confront [the] defendant who
has wronged [her] ... [and] look [the] defendant in the eye and let him know
the suffering his misconduct has caused." 99 In this regard, what a victim has to
say may not have legal significance, but the practice is nonetheless important
because of the dignitary, cathartic, and moral education goals it furthers.
The way in which courts have specifically interpreted the CVRA's language
granting victims the "right to be reasonably heard at ... sentencing"'0° further
advances the rite-based theory for victim allocution. The statute's language has
caused some commentators and jurists to question whether the victim has the
right to speak to the court, or whether the victim's views can be limited to some
other form, such as a written presentation. In Kenna I and Degenhardt, the
courts concluded that the CVRA provided victims with the right to speak at
sentencing," ' while the court in Marcello implied that the victim's right to ad-
dress the court should be predicated on the relevancy of the victim's proffered
statement. °2
In reaching these divergent results, all three courts began by acknowledging
that the phrase "reasonably heard" can be interpreted in a variety of context-
98. 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1349 (D. Utah 2005) (quoting United States v. De Alba Pagan,
33 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 1994)). Professor Douglas E. Beloof agrees that the under
the CVRA, "whether or not the victim has relevant facts to present does not mat-
ter." Beloof, Judicial Leadership, supra note 61, at 39.
99. 435 F.3d lo11, 1o16-17 (9th Cir. 2006).
loo. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(4) (West 2007).
ol. Kenna I, 435 F.3d at i1o6; Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1345.
'02. 370 F. Supp. 2d 745, 746, 747-48 (N.D. I11. 2005); see supra notes 67-74 (discussing
Marcello in greater depth).
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dependent ways.'03 For example, one could interpret the right to be "reasonably
heard" by drawing an analogy between hearing and speaking. In common Eng-
lish, one cannot be heard unless there is sound, presumably through the act of
speaking. °4 Alternatively, the phrase "reasonably heard" could be interpreted as
a legal term of art, "commonly understood as meaning to bring one's position
to the attention of the decision maker orally or in writing."'0 The courts in
Kenna I and Degenhardt also acknowledged that the CVRA's language granting
victims the right to be reasonably heard is inconsistent with the language of
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(B) granting a specific subset of
crime victims the right to speak at sentencing." 6 The courts recognized that this
varying language could raise additional questions regarding the scope of the
CVRA right. They nonetheless resolved this linguistic inconsistency in favor of a
victim's right to speak by turning to the legislative history of the statute.'07
103. Kenna I, 435 F.3d at 1o14; Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1345-46; Marcello, 370 F.
Supp. 2d at 748.
104. In Kenna I, the victim contended that the right to be reasonably heard could be
defined by looking to a common dictionary that defined "hear" as "to perceive
(sound) by the ear." 435 F.3d at 1014.
105. Id. (emphasis added); see Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1345.
1o6. Kenna 1, 435 F. 3d at 1O14; Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1346-47. The CVRA grants
victims the right to be "reasonably heard," 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(4) (West 2007)
(emphasis added), while Rule 32(i)(4)(B) directs that prior to imposing a sen-
tence, "the court must address any victim of a crime of violence or sexual abuse
who is present at sentencing and must permit the victim to speak or submit any
information about the sentence." FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(B) (emphasis added).
The Federal Rule has been subject to criticism and judicial revision. See, e.g., De-
genhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1342-43 (holding that the CVRA's broad grant of allo-
cution rights to all victims overrides the Federal Rule's more limited grant of allo-
cution rights only to victims of violent or sexual assaults); Barnard, supra note 56,
at 40-41 (advocating for a change to the federal rules); Cassell, supra note 61, at
856,886.
The Rule is currently under review. An amendment has been proposed to
delete the language granting allocution rights only to victims of violent or sexual
crimes. It is expected that this amendment will be granted, bringing Rule
32(i)(4)(B) into accordance with the CVRA's grant of sentencing allocution rights
to all crime victims. See Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1346 n.26; Advisory Comm.
on the Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure, Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure To Implement the CVRA, 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 144, 144,
146 (2006) [hereinafter Proposed Amendments]. Other portions of the Rules are
also under review, along with a proffered new Rule 43.1, which seeks to more fully
integrate victims into the criminal process in accordance with the CVRA. See Pro-
posed Amendments, supra, at 146.
107. Kenna 1, 435 F.3d at 1015; Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1345. The court in
Marcello questioned the helpfulness of the CVRA's legislative history, noting that
it is extremely limited, consists merely of statements by the law's primary author
and co-sponsor, and lacks any of the "debate or exchange of ideas that more fre-
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In particular, the courts turned to floor statements made by the statute's
two sponsors, Senator Diane Feinstein of California and Senator John Kyl of
Arizona. In these statements, the Senators emphasized that the victim's right to
be reasonably heard was "intended to allow crime victims to directly address the
court in person." '' s Senator Kyl also emphasized it was not Congress's intent
that the
term "reasonably" in the phrase "to be reasonably heard".. . provide
any excuse for denying a victim the right to appear in person and di-
rectly address the court .... This section would fail in its intent if
courts determined that written, rather than oral communication, could
generally satisfy this right. On the other hand, the term "reasonably" is
meant to allow for alternative methods of communicating a victim's
views to the court when the victim is unable to attend the proceed-
ings.' °9
Senator Feinstein echoed this sentiment, stating, "Only if it is not practical for
the victim to speak in person or if the victim wishes to be heard by the court in
a different fashion should this provision mean anything other than an in-person
right to be heard.""...
The Kenna I and Degenhardt courts further reasoned that the goals of vic-
tim allocution are most efficiently served when victims are granted the right to
voice their views in person. A written presentation hardly seems adequate where
"victims want an opportunity to force defendants to confront the human toll of
their crimes. Such confrontation is only possible in open court, where the vic-
tim has an opportunity to stand face-to-face with her victimizer and explain the
pain that flowed from the crime.""' To interpret the statute otherwise would
shortchange the victim allocution goals of empowering the victim and educat-
ing the defendant.
The CVRA thus acknowledges that victim allocution should dignify the vic-
tim's personal experience by granting the victim the opportunity to address the
court."' Likewise, interpreting the victim's sentencing right as the rite of speak-
ing enlightens the defendant. The defendant's understanding of the victim's ex-
quently accompanies the art of law-crafting." See 370 F. Supp. 2d at 749 & n.8; see
also Baron-Evans, supra note 11, at 49 (noting the limited legislative history and
debate regarding the CVRA); Bierschbach, supra note 11, at 45 (same).
1o8. April 2004 Senate Floor Statements, supra note 18, at 64 (statement of Sen. Kyl).
lo9. Id.
110. Id.
111. Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1348.
112. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (discussing victims' desire to have
their experience of the crime and their status of victimhood acknowledged by the
court).
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perience is not limited to the government's presentation of evidence, but is
broadened by hearing directly from the victim, in her own independent voice.' 3
D. The Correction of Victim Allocution Denials
The CVRA's treatment of denials of victim allocution signals that as be-
tween the relevancy and rite-based theories, the latter may better explain and
justify how courts approach this right. The CVRA's language, and courts' inter-
pretation and application of the same, emphasize that when a victim is denied
the right to allocute, the error should be corrected. Specifically, and as discussed
supra, victims can seek to enforce their rights under the CVRA by filing a writ of
mandamus with the appropriate court of appeals.'1 4 If the court deems an error
has occurred, the victim can make a motion to reopen the proceedings in the
trial court."5
113. A lingering practical problem in interpreting the CVRA as granting victims the
right to speak must nonetheless be acknowledged. The CVRA explicitly directs
that
[i]n a case where the court finds that the number of crime victims makes
it impracticable to accord all of the crime victims the rights described in
subsection (a), the court shall fashion a reasonable procedure to give ef-
fect to this chapter that does not unduly complicate or prolong the pro-
ceedings.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(2) (West 2007). Hence, even though a victim may desire to
verbally address the court, in certain circumstances, a judge can legitimately deny
the victim that opportunity.
Advocates for the CVRA, as well as courts who hold that the statute grants
victims the right to speak, do not address this problem satisfactorily. They cele-
brate the victim's right to speak, while minimizing the CVRA's express command
that a court can decide otherwise. For example, in Degenhardt, the court asserted
that victims should never be denied their right to speak at sentencing, while si-
multaneously acknowledging that the CVRA grants courts the power to fashion
an alternative procedure when faced with a large number of victims. 405 F. Supp.
2d at 1351. By allowing judges to place limits on the number of victims permitted
to speak, the statute dampens a rite-based approach to allocution, and likewise
hampers fulfillment of the proffered dignitary and moral education aspects of the
practice. In this regard then, drafters of, and advocates for, the CVRA seem to be
speaking out of both sides of their mouths. In a loud voice, advocates proclaim to
victims, "Your rights are absolute," while under their breath they reluctantly mut-
ter, "except where impracticable."
114. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(3) (West 2007); see supra notes 42-5o and accompanying
text.
115. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(5)(A)-(C) (West 2007); see also, e.g., Kenna v. U.S. Dist.
Court (Kenna 1), 435 F.3d ioll, lo18 (9th Cir. 20o6) (granting the victim's petition
for a writ of mandamus and ordering the district court to accept any timely filed
motions to reopen sentencing proceedings by the victim). A victim's right to re-
quest that a sentencing hearing be reopened is predicated on the victim's compli-
ance with the procedural requirements of the CVRA. See id. § 3771(d)( 5)(A)-(B)
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In Kenna I, the court indicated that the CVRA requires courts to issue the
writ "whenever [they] find that the district court's order reflects an abuse of
discretion or legal error.""' 6 It went on to determine that the district court's de-
nial of the victim's right to allocute constituted a legal error requiring correc-
tion.117 The court described a victim's right to speak at sentencing as "indefeasi-
ble.""' As a result, the court stated that when a court has denied a victim her
right to allocute, the only way to "give effect to [the victim's] right to speak as
guaranteed... by the CVRA [is] to vacate the sentence and hold a new sentenc-
ing hearing."" 9 This approach implies that such denials should be treated as re-
versible error. In essence, when the right has been denied, it must be corrected.
Similarly, in United States v. Degenhardt, in support of its position that courts
do not possess the discretion to deny a victim the right to allocution, the court
cited a series of cases regarding the review of defendant allocution denials that
employed a reversible-error standard.' As interpreted in Degenhardt, the de-
fendant allocution cases instruct that the denial of allocution always prejudices
the holder of the right. Consequently, the right must always be provided, and by
implication, be corrected when denied."'
The courts' broad approach to the correction of errors indicates that vic-
tims should always be granted their allocution right, regardless of whether they
have anything to say that would alter the defendant's sentence. Hearing from
the victim is important not simply because the victim may provide information
to the court, but also because the victim and defendant might benefit in various
ways from speaking in the other's presence regarding the crime. In correcting
(establishing that a victim must clearly assert her rights before the district court,
and then petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus within ten days of
the district court's denial of her right).
116. 435 F.3d at 1017.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1o16. Black's Law Dictionary defines "indefeasible" as "not vulnerable to be-
ing defeated, revoked, or lost." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 783 (8th ed. 2004).
119. 435 F.3d at 1017.
120. 405 F. Supp. zd 1341, 1349 n.45 (D. Utah 2005) (citing cases).
121. In citing the defendant allocution cases, however, the court in Degenhardt failed
to acknowledge that the reversible-error approach does not prevail among the
federal courts and that several of the courts it cited currently employ a Rule 52
analysis for defendant allocution denials. Compare United States v. Griggs, 431
F.3d 111o, 1114 n.4 (8th Cir. 2005) (implying that a harmless-error analysis is ap-
propriate for denial of a defendant's right to allocute), and United States v. Reyna,
358 F.3d 344, 350 (5th Cir. 2004) (rejecting a reversible-error approach in favor of
harmless-error review), with United States v. Walker, 896 F.2d 295, 301 (8th Cir.
199o) (holding that denial of a defendant's right to allocute requires a remand for
resentencing), and United States v. Posner, 868 F.2d 720, 724 (5th Cir. 1989) (treat-
ing an allocution error as reversible). For further discussion of the standard of re-
view for defendant allocution denials, see infra Section III.C.
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victim allocution denials, therefore, the transformative value of the rite of allo-
cution takes precedence over the value of any calculable impact the victim's
speech might have on the defendant's sentence.
As the preceding discussion indicates, the victim's right to be reasonably
heard at sentencing proceedings serves a variety of goals. While victim allocu-
tion can fulfill a utilitarian function by impacting the defendant's sentence, the
practice also serves to honor and acknowledge the victim's encounter with the
defendant, as well as the victim's presence in the court system. Granting the vic-
tim the right to speak allows the victim to take a therapeutic step toward healing
from the defendant's wrongful acts and establishing a new moral balance be-
tween the two individuals. Likewise, the practice serves to educate the defendant
as to the broader consequences of his criminal choices. Hence, the transforma-
tive nature of the rite of allocution is emphasized.
However, when one compares the victim's right to allocution under the
CVRA with the defendant's comparable right, the theories underlying the two
practices do not entirely square with one another. As the next Part discusses in
greater depth, the defendant's right to allocute is grounded largely in the as-
sumption that what the defendant has to say could lessen his sentence. In es-
sence, defendant allocution is driven by its mitigating effects, rather than by
considerations of the ritualistic benefits that may exist in the practice. The dif-
ferences between victim and defendant allocution are evident not only in how
modern courts tend to receive defendant allocution statements, but also in how
defendant allocution denials are reviewed and corrected.' 22
III. DEFENDANT ALLOCUTION
A. The Common Law History of Defendant Allocution
In contrast to the relatively modern history of victim allocution, the defen-
dant's right to allocute at sentencing has been an integral part of the criminal
justice system for centuries,'23 but has not been subject to extensive judicial or
scholarly attention. English case law dating from as early as 1689 discusses de-
122. See infra Section III.C.
123. See ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 9:18, at 404 (3d. ed. 2004);
ANDREW KLEIN, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 46 (1988);
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1231 (3d ed. 2000); Paul W. Barrett, Al-
locution, 9 Mo. L. REV. 115 (1944); Kevin Francis O'Neill, Muzzling Death Row In-
mates: Applying the First Amendment to Regulations that Restrict a Condemned
Prisoner's Last Words, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1159, 1178-8o (2001); Thomas, supra note 57,
at 2645-47; Jonathan Scofield Marshall, Comment, Lights, Camera, Allocution:
Contemporary Relevance or Director's Dream?, 62 TUL. L. REV. 207, 209-10 (1987);
Caren Myers, Note, Encouraging Allocution at Capital Sentencing: A Proposal for
Use Immunity, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 798-99 (1997); Note, Procedural Due Process
atludicial Sentencingfor Felony, 81 HARV. L. REV. 821, 832-33 (1968).
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fendant allocution with limited fanfare,' as do legal commentators from the
nineteenth century.'25 Modern courts tend to provide only a basic explanation
of what is entailed in a defendant's right to allocute and do not engage in exten-
sive discussions as to its history, or of its transformation from its common law
uses to its contemporary applications. '26
At English common law, courts were required to ask a defendant who was
found guilty of a capital felony or treason charge whether there was any reason
judgment should not be pronounced against him.' The defendant could raise a
limited number of legal arguments in response, and this brief exchange between
the defendant and the judge often represented the defendant's only opportunity
124. Rex v. Royce, (1767) 98 Eng. Rep. 81, 88 (K.B.); The King v. Speke, (1695) 91 Eng.
Rep. 872 (K.B.); Rex & Regina v. Geary, (1689) 91 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B.); Anony-
mous, (1689) 87 Eng. Rep. 175 (K.B.); see also Barrett, supra note 123, at 121-23 (dis-
cussing English cases).
125. 5 RONALD A. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 376 (12th
ed. 1957); 1 J.F. ARCHBOLD, A COMPLETE PRACTICAL TREATISE ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 577 (New York, Banks & Brothers 8th ed. 1877); 2 JOEL PRENTISS
BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1129-30 (2d ed. 1913); 4 WILLIAM BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *375; 1 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE
CRIMINAL LAW *700 (Springfield, G. and C. Merriam 1841); 1 JAMES FITZJAMES
STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 471 (photo. reprint
1996) (1883).
126. One must carefully cull justifications for the right's existence from court rulings.
Likewise, only a limited body of scholarship exists that studies the defendant's al-
locution right. Paul W. Barrett's work, Allocution, published over sixty years ago,
serves as the most comprehensive examination of defendant allocution in England
and the United States. Barrett, supra note 123. Professor Barrett's study focused
primarily on the history of the use of defendant allocution in American state
courts, but did not devote much attention to the question of why the right exists
in modern practice.
Since Professor Barrett's work, defendant allocution has received only selec-
tive treatment from scholars and practitioners. See Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless:
The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449 (2005) (advocating
for more defendant speech, including allocution, during the criminal process);
O'Neill, supra note 123, at 1178-8o (arguing for broader allocution rights for de-
fendants in capital trials); Marshall, supra note 123, at 209-10 (raising questions
about the usefulness of defendant allocution); Myers, supra note 123, at 798-99
(arguing for broader allocution rights for defendants in capital trials); A.G. Bar-
nett, Annotation, Necessity and Sufficiency of Question to Defendant as to Whether
He Has Anything To Say Why Sentence Should Not Be Pronounced Against Him, 96
A.L.R.2d 1292 (1964). Recently, however, and as referenced earlier, Professor
Thomas has made a valuable contribution to the discourse regarding defendant
allocution by engaging in a thoughtful study regarding modern justifications for
the right. See Thomas, supra note 57, at 2645-47.
127. See ANDERSON, supra note 125, at 376; ARCHBOLD, supra note 125, at 577; BISHOP,
supra note 125, at 1129; Barrett, supra note 123, at 115; Thomas, supra note 57, at
2646.
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to be heard by the court.12 Unlike in modern American practice, common law
criminal defendants were not guaranteed the right to counsel and were denied
the right to speak on their own behalf. 9 Allocution therefore often served as
the sole means for a defendant personally to present the court with legal de-
fenses or mitigating evidence in answer to the charge against him. "' Without a
right to allocution, the defendant might be sentenced to death without ever
having the opportunity to speak to the court.'31 Hence, it was generally accepted
that a defendant's right to speak prior to being sentenced was indispensable, the
denial of which required voiding the judgment, and in more modern practice,
resentencing.1
32
Over time, the English practice of defendant allocution evolved. Defendants
were no longer limited to raising a particular set of legal arguments to escape
judgment; instead, courts granted them the general opportunity to plead for
mercy.3 3 Concurrently, in American courts, defendants possessed the added ad-
vantage of the guarantee of assistance of counsel, 34 and the opportunity to
speak on their own behalf at trial.' 35 Likewise, far fewer crimes were subject to
the punishment of death. In light of these changes, the original reasons for de-
128. See ARCHBOLD, supra note 125, at 577; BLACKSTONE, supra note 125, at *375; Bar-
rett, supra note 123, at 126-40; John H. Dawson, Note, Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure-Court Should Afford Defendant a Personal Opportunity To Speak Before
Sentence Is Announced, 6 AM. U. L. REV. 117 (1957).
129. See Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961); Robalewski v. Superior Court,
197 A.2d 751, 753 (R.I. 1964) (noting that at common law, a defendant did not have
the right to counsel upon a not guilty plea as to issues of fact in felony and treason
cases); Barnett, supra note 126, § 3, at 1295. But see Barrett, supra note 123, at 122-23
& nn.39, 39a (discussing Rex v. Royce, (1767) 98 Eng. Rep. 81 (K.B.), in which the
defendant was represented by counsel).
130. See Thomas, supra note 57, at 2649, 2655-56.
131. Unlike in modern American legal practice, where the death penalty is available
only for homicides, at English common law the punishment of death was applica-
ble to all crimes except petty larceny and mayhem. See STEPHEN, supra note 125, at
487.
132. See Dawson, supra note 128, at 117-18; see also infra Section III.C (discussing how
defendant allocution errors are generally corrected). For a discussion regarding
the historic requirement to void the judgment against the defendant and resen-
tence him when he was denied the right to allocute, see ANDERSON, supra note 125,
at 376; BISHOP, supra note 125, at 113o; BLACKSTONE, supra note 125, at *375; and
Barrett, supra note 123, at 117-121.
133. See ARCHBOLD, supra note 125, at 577; BISHOP, supra note 125, at 1129; CHITTY, su-
pra note 125, at *700; NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, GUIDES FOR
SENTENCING 43 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter NAT'L COUNCIL]; Barrett, supra note
123, at 124-140.
134. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
135. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987).
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fendant allocution no longer apply. Appointed or retained counsel can fulfill
the goals of common-law allocution by making arguments at trial and at sen-
tencing, by challenging information contained in pre-sentence reports, and by
filing post-judgment appeals.' 36 Commentators, therefore, have questioned
whether the right has turned into an "idle ceremony" and "ancient formality"
whose purposes are better fulfilled by modern procedural practice.'
In its primary opinion on defendant allocution, Green v. United States,
8
the Supreme Court recognized that the original justifications for a defendant's
common-law right of allocution have waned. Charting the history of the right,
the Court commented that it was "not unmindful of the relevant major changes
that have evolved in criminal procedure since the seventeenth century."'' 9
Nonetheless, the Court stated that
we see no reason why a procedural rule should be limited to the cir-
cumstances under which it arose if reasons for the right it protects re-
main. None of [the] modern innovations lessens the need for the de-
fendant, personally, to have the opportunity to present to the court his
plea in mitigation. The most persuasive counsel may not be able to
speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence,
speak for himself.
1 40
The Court went on to affirm the importance of the sentencing right, holding
that it included two components, the defendant's right to speak on his own be-
half, and his right to present information in mitigation of his punishment.
14'
The first of these components implicates a rite-based approach to allocution,
while the latter focuses more on whether the defendant's statement was relevant
to, or capable of, mitigating his sentence. To the extent that courts have exam-
ined the defendant's allocution right, the mitigation or relevancy approach pre-
dominates, both in how courts discuss the right, as well as when they allow for
resentencing in the face of denial of the right.
42
136. See Thomas, supra note 57, at 2649.
137. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 123, at 124; Dawson, supra note 128, at 118; Barnett, su-
pra note 126, § 3, at 1295.
138. 365 U.S. 301 (1961).
139. Id. at 304.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Thomas, supra note 57, at 2643-44, 2655-57.
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B. The Modern Practice of Defendant Allocution
Since its decision in Green, the Supreme Court has said very little about de-
fendant allocution. 43 In contrast, the lower federal courts have more actively
discussed the scope and practice of the right. The following review of federal
case law builds upon the limited existing scholarship regarding modern defen-
dant allocution and seeks to flesh out the current practices and theories sup-
porting the right. In surveying the existing federal case law,'" it becomes evi-
dent that, unlike victim allocution under the CVRA, modern defendant
allocution is justified primarily by the mitigating effect it has upon the calcula-
tion of the defendant's sentence.
45
The defendant's right to allocute is currently detailed in Rule 32 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure. The rule states that "before imposing sen-
tence, the court must ... address the defendant personally in order to permit
143. The Court has made passing reference to the defendant's allocution right in
Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 27-28 (1999); Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496,
501 (1972); United States v. Behrens, 375 U.S. 162, 165 (1963); Andrews v. United
States, 373 U.S. 334, 336-37 (1963); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 489
(1962); and Van Hook v. United States, 365 U.S. 609, 609 (1961) (per curiam). The
Court discussed the right in greater depth in Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424,
425-26 (1962), but has said very little about why it deems the right important.
144. This study also contains the occasional reference to relevant state court decisions.
145. Professor Thomas identifies this prevailing theory in her article, Thomas, supra
note 57, at 2655, and I will refer to it frequently throughout this Section. While
similar to my proffered relevancy approach for victim allocution, I believe Profes-
sor Thomas's "mitigation" theory provides a more appropriate title for the
prominent theory supporting defendant allocution. Stemming directly from the
Court's language in Green, 365 U.S. at 304, as well as the language in Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 32, see infra note 146, an explicit purpose of defendant allo-
cution is to permit the defendant to present information to the court to mitigate
his sentence. Conversely, I draw a slightly wider net when I identify relevancy as
one of the major theories for victim allocution. The cases do not discuss victim al-
locution in terms of its mitigation or aggravation purposes, but rather discuss the
practice, in part, in terms of its general relevancy. While it is certainly possible
that a victim may provide the sentencing court with information to mitigate the
defendant's sentence, this will not always be the case. Similarly, victim allocution
is not always intended to aggravate the defendant's sentence either.
As I discussed earlier in this paper, victim allocution may be described, in
part, in terms of a relevancy theory. However, describing defendant allocution in
terms of relevancy slightly overreaches. As Professor Thomas aptly notes, the
practice appears to exist primarily because of its mitigating power on a defen-
dant's sentence. Thomas, supra note 57, at 2643-44, 2655-57. Hence, I discuss de-
fendant allocution as predominantly explained by a mitigation theory, while ac-
knowledging that my relevancy theory for victim allocution runs along a parallel
but distinct path.
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the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence."' 46
Following the Court's decision in Green, the federal appellate courts have been
emphatic that Rule 32 be applied "quite literally."' 47 Conversations between the
court and defense counsel are not sufficient to satisfy the right 4s Instead, it
must be evident to all involved, especially the defendant, that he is permitted to
speak to the court prior to the pronouncement of his sentence. 49 The sentenc-
ing judge, in turn, is required to listen carefully to what the defendant has to
say. 50 By requiring the sentencing judge to listen with care to the defendant's
statement, courts emphasize that the defendant's opportunity for allocution
should not be viewed as an empty ritual, but rather as a vital and integral part of
the sentencing process. 5' Hearing from the defendant, therefore, matters. In de-
fining what matters however, courts generally focus on the mitigating influence
the defendant's speech may have on his sentence.'52
Courts appear willing to hear from remorseful and apologetic defendants,
but are quick to cut off defendants who use their allocution right to reargue
146. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). Originally promulgated in 1944, the portion of
Rule 32 that addressed defendant sentencing rights "was substantially a restate-
ment of existing procedure." FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (advisory committee's note).
From 1944 until 1966, the right was listed in Rule 32(a). From 1966 until 1989, the
rule's numeration shifted to Rule 32(a)(1). In 1989, amendments to Rule 32 again
shifted the allocution language to Rule 32(a)(1)(C). In 1994, further amendments
to the rule moved the language to Rule 32(c)(3)(C). As referenced above, a defen-
dant's right to allocution currently can be found in Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). Its lan-
guage, however, has remained constant since 1966. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (advi-
sory committee's note). In an attempt to reduce confusion regarding the roving
placement of the right within the rule, I will limit general reference to the right as
"Rule 32." I will nonetheless honor older citations to the rule as they appear in
specific cases.
147. United States v. Magwood, 445 F.3d 826, 829 (5th Cir. 2oo6); see United States v.
Phillips, 936 F.2d 1252, 1255 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Pelaez, 930 F.2d 520,
522-23 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Miller, 849 F.2d 896, 897 (4th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Buckley, 847 F.2d 991, lOOl (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Dick-
son, 712 F.2d 952, 956 (sth Cir. 1983).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, io F.3d 1O86, 1092 (4th Cir. 1993).
149. United States v. De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 1994). Rule 32 also specifi-
cally grants the defense counsel and prosecutor the opportunity to speak. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(i), (iii).
150. United States v. Mack, 200 F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Li, 115
F.3d 125, 133 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1503-04 (9th Cir.
1995); Pelaez, 930 F.2d at 524; United States v. Sparrow, 673 F.2d 862, 865 (5th Cir.
1982).
151. United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 627 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Barnes, 948 F.2d 325, 331 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Serhant, 740 F.2d 548, 554
(7thCir. 1984); Sparrow, 673 F.2d at 865.
152. See Thomas, supra note 57, at 2655-57.
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their case;'53 to challenge the court, judicial system, or government; or to con-
tinue to protest their innocence. For example, in United States v. Burgos-
Anduar,15 4 the court exhibited the judicial predisposition toward hearing only
from remorseful defendants. There, the defendant, a legislator in the Puerto Ri-
can Senate, was found guilty of criminal trespass in United States naval terri-
tory. She, along with others, had protested military exercises on a local island.'
5
The defendant was afforded her right to allocute, through which she claimed
her innocence and challenged the court's authority as well as the evidence it re-
lied upon in finding her guilty.' 56 As a result of the defendant's allocution, the
judge raised her sentence from that which the court had originally contem-
plated.57 On appeal, the reviewing court acknowledged that a sentencing court
must provide the defendant with an opportunity to present "any information in
mitigation of sentence," and permit "the defendant to speak on all topics which
the defendant considers relevant."'' 8 The court also determined that the defen-
dant was afforded this right. However, as noted by the appellate court, the de-
fendant's allocution did not have the desired effect of reducing her sentence.
The defendant
essentially declared herself innocent of crime and thus ... refus[ed] to
acknowledge the impact of her illegal action.... [S]he [also] dispar-
aged the validity of the law she broke, accusing the United States Navy
of breaking the "greater law." Her statements certainly suggest a lack of
remorse, an attempt to avoid responsibility for her actions, and even a
likelihood of repeating her illegal actions. Any of these reasons may
have legitimately led the sentencing judge to increase appellant's sen-
tence.159
Similarly, United States v. Mitchell displayed courts' distaste for defiant de-
fendants who challenge the legal system."' In Mitchell, the defendant was found
guilty of failing to report for military duty. The appellate court described his
speech before the sentencing court as
an intemperate harangue concerning his personal views on moral ques-
tions. It went far beyond the bounds of propriety; it was of matters in
153. See United States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1o18, 1025 (ioth Cir. 1993).
154. 275 F. 3d 23 (1st Cir. 2001).
155. Id. at 26-27.
156. Id. at 27.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 28-29.
159. Id. at 30; see also Natapoff, supra note 126, at 1467-69 (discussing how a defen-
dant's attempt to explain his actions to the court can be misinterpreted as claim-
ing innocence); Thomas, supra note 57, at 2661-66 (commenting that allocution
statements of innocence or defiance are not well received by courts).
16o. 392 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1968).
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no way relevant to the prosecution and far exceeded his right of allocu-
tion, a right to make a statement on his own behalf or in mitigation of
punishment....
Allocution does not grant a defendant the right to enter into a dia-
tribe of the sentencing Judge, or of the Court, or the judicial system of
which he is a part. 61
Mitchell and Burgos-Andujar do not only display courts' distaste for anything
but a remorseful apology from the defendant, but they also highlight the con-
tinued prevalence of the mitigation theory underlying defendant allocution.
Courts are interested in hearing from a defendant if what he has to say might
lessen his sentence. Otherwise, the message is that defendants best stay quiet lest
they risk adversely impacting their sentences.
The dominance of a mitigation-based theory for defendant allocution is not
entirely without reason162 By focusing on whether there are grounds upon
which a court might reduce a defendant's sentence, the practice serves both the
defendant and the sentencing judge. 63 The defendant is provided with a final
opportunity to attempt to make a difference to his sentence, whether through
pleas of mercy6 4 or statements that would allow the court to ensure that the
sentence is specific and appropriate to the defendant.6 ' Likewise, the judge is
afforded
the opportunity to evaluate the total person who stands at the bar of
justice: to note the physical appearance and demeanor; the tone, tem-
per and rhythm of speech; the facial expressions, the hands, the reveal-
ing look into the eyes. In sum, [without allocution, the judge is de-
161. Id. at 215-16; see also United States v. Mack, 200 F.3d 653, 658 (9 th Cir. 2000) (de-
ciding that the court did not deny the defendants' right to allocution where the
court asked that the defendants not discuss their motives, philosophies, and be-
liefs on issues that did not pertain to mitigating their sentence); United States v.
Kellogg, 955 F.2d 1244, 1250 (9th Cir. 1992) (deciding that the court did not violate
the defendant's right to allocution where it interrupted the defendant during his
discussion of "giant loopholes" which exist in the tax laws and his opinion that
the IRS was incompetent).
162. See Thomas, supra note 57, at 2655-57.
163. See Watts v. DuBois, 660 F. Supp. 1246, 1249 (D. Colo. 1987).
164. See, e.g., United States v. Prouty, 303 F.3d 1249, 1251 (iith Cir. 2002); United States
v. Quintana, 300 F.3d 1227, 1231 (iith Cir. 2002); Burgos-Andujar, 275 F.3d at 28-29;
United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 981 (sth Cir. 2000) (per curiam); United
States v. De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Barnes, 948
F.2d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1991); NAT'L COUN cIL, supra note 133, at 43.
165. Quintana, 300 F.3d at 1231; United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 287 (3d Cir.
2OO); United States v. Tamayo, 8o F.3d 1514, 1518 (1ith Cir. 1996); De Alba Pagan,
33 F.3d at 129; Barnes, 948 F.2d at 328.
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prived of] those impressions gleaned through the senses in any per-
sonal confrontation in which one attempts to assess the credibility or to
evaluate the true moral fiber of another.
166
The predominance of the mitigation theory is equally evident in how courts re-
view allegations of the denial of a defendant's right to allocute. 6 7
C. The Correction of Defendant Allocution Denials
The majority of federal appellate courts reviewing denials of defendant al-
locution apply an analysis guided by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52.16
Rule 52 details the standards of review for direct appeal in the federal courts. It
commands that "[a] ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect
substantial rights must be disregarded,' ' 69 and that "[a] plain error that affects
substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the
court's attention.'
70
While most federal appellate courts employ a Rule 52 analysis for reviewing
defendant allocution denials, one must note the curious fact that the Supreme
Court, in addressing defendant allocution denials in its decisions in Green v.
United States, 7' Hill v. United States, 7 and Van Hook v. United States, 73 made
no reference to Rule 52. The Court's silence regarding Rule 52 may have been
based on its understanding that the rule did not categorically apply to all trial or
sentencing errors, and that therefore, a reversible-error approach was appropri-
ate for allocution denials. 74 At the time of the Green, Hill, and Van Hook deci-
sions, the law was unsettled as to whether Rule 52 applied to all claimed errors,
166. Del Piano v. United States, 575 F.2d lO66, 1O69 (3d Cir. 1978).
167. See Thomas, supra note 57, at 2656-57.
168. See United States v. Griggs, 431 F.3d 111o, 1114 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Gunning, 401 F.3d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Reyna, 358 F. 3d 344,
347-50 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Quintana, 30o F.3d 1227, 1231-32 (ith Cir.
2002); United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 284 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Lewis, io F.3d iO86, 1092 (4th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Riascos-Suarez,
73 F.3d 616, 627 (6th Cir. 1996) (invoking a reversible error standard of review but
relying upon cases that apply a Rule 52 plain-error or harmless-error standard of
review). But see infra notes 222-229 and accompanying text (discussing the courts
that review defendant allocution denials under a reversible-error approach).
169. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (harmless error).
170. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5 2(b) (plain error).
171. 365 U.S. 301 (1961).
172. 368 U.S. 424 (1962).
173. 365 U.S. 609 (1961) (per curiam).
174. See United States v. Reyna, 358 F.3d 344, 349-50 (sth Cir. 2004) (speculating as to
why the Supreme Court did not discuss Rule 52 in its key allocution cases); United
States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 281-83 (3d Cir. 2001) (same).
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or whether there existed a subset of errors requiring automatic reversal or re-
mand.75 However, in its 1993 decision of United States v. Olano, the Supreme
Court strongly implied that Rule 52 was the appropriate means by which to cor-
rect all trial and sentencing errors.' 76 The Court's subsequent opinion in John-
son v. United States solidified this position.17 The appellate courts that apply a
Rule 52 standard of review to defendant allocution denials imply that, in con-
junction with the Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence regarding Rule 52,
allocution errors should be brought within the rule's ambit.' 7s The manner in
which courts apply Rule 52 to allocution denials varies, however.
1. The Rule 52 Question of Prejudice
A Rule 52 inquiry asks whether the claimed error affected the defendant's
substantial rights. In addressing this question, courts examine whether the error
affected the outcome of the trial court's proceedings in a manner prejudicial to
the defendant.7 9 Several courts have been reluctant to cast the prejudice net too
broadly, holding that if a defendant is sentenced at the lowest end of the appli-
cable Sentencing Guideline range, and he or his lawyers did not make any ar-
guments to the court warranting a departure from the range, then the defen-
175. Reyna, 358 F.3d at 349-50; Adams, 252 F.3d at 283.
176. See 507 U.S. 725, 731-33 (1993) ("Rule 52(b) defines a single category of forfeited,
but reversible error.").
177. See 520 U.S. 461, 466 (1997). Both Olano and Johnson dealt with questions arising
under Rule 52(b)'s plain-error analysis, but there is little question that when re-
viewing timely raised errors, Rule 52(a) applies. See Neder v. United States, 527
U.S. 1, 7 (1999); Bank of N.S. v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 (1988); United
States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 448 n.l (1986). The only exception to the default ap-
plication of harmless-error or plain-error review arises in the context of "struc-
tural errors." See Neder, 527 U.S. at 7-8; Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468-69. Structural er-
rors occur where the defendant is completely denied the assistance of counsel or
the right to self-representation, where a biased judge oversees the proceedings,
where the grand jury selection is influenced by racial discrimination, where the
defendant is denied a public trial, or where a defective reasonable-doubt instruc-
tion is given to the jury. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468-69.
178. See Reyna, 358 F.3d at 350 ("[D]ecisions from the Supreme Court strictly applying
Rule 52 regardless of the seriousness of the claimed error lead us to conclude that
we should reexamine [our position] that on direct appeal the defendant is auto-
matically entitled to re-sentencing when he is not afforded his right of allocution
[and instead employ Rule 52]."); Adams, 252 F.3d at 283-84 (same). Other courts,
without engaging in a significant analysis of the issue, appear to agree. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mack, 2oo F.3d 653, 657 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Cole, 27
F.3d 996, 998 (4 th Cir. 1994).
179. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734; Adams, 252 F.3d at 285.
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dant was not prejudiced by the denial of his allocution right.' These courts
reason that if the defendant received the lowest sentence possible despite not
having the opportunity to allocute, the denial of the right made no difference to
his sentence, and hence there was no prejudice. 's In essence, the lack of defen-
dant allocution in such cases does not matter because it could not mitigate the
sentence."2
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that denial of a defendant's allocu-
tion right is presumed prejudicial if there is any possibility, no matter how re-
mote, that had the defendant been permitted to speak, the court might have
granted a lower sentence.'8 3 This standard applies even if the defendant was sen-
tenced at the bottom of the appropriate Sentencing Guideline range, and even if
the defendant or his attorney had already raised during the sentencing proceed-
ings the issues that the defendant would have addressed in his allocution .14 The
18o. United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3 d 616, 627-28 (6th Cir. 1996) (remanding the
case for resentencing where the defendant was denied the opportunity to allocute
and did not receive the shortest sentence allowed by statute); United States v.
Lewis, lo F.3d lO86, 1092 (4 th Cir. 1993) (finding that the defendant did not suffer
prejudice when he received the lowest sentence possible); United States v. Mejia,
953 F.2d 461, 468 (9th Cir. 1991) (same), abrogated on other grounds recognized by
United States v. Caperna, 251 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2001).
181. This argument may be undercut somewhat by the increased discretion now af-
forded to judges under United States v. Booker. 543 U.S. 320 (2005). Prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Booker, a defendant's ability to seek flexibility or alter
his sentence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was limited. However, by mov-
ing away from a mandatory application of the Guidelines as directed by Booker,
defendants may have far more room to argue for, and receive, sentences that fall
outside a prescribed sentencing range. From a mitigating perspective, defendant
allocution may "matter" far more in a post-Booker world. Even if a defendant is
sentenced at the bottom of a Guideline range, there is always the chance that the
court could have departed downward. Thomas, supra note 57, at 2653-55.
182. The Eleventh Circuit has adopted this same general approach, claiming remand
for re-sentencing is appropriate only where the defendant has suffered "manifest
injustice." See, e.g., United States v. Prouty, 303 F.3d 1249, 1253 (iith Cir. 2002);
United States v. Quintana, 300 F.3d 1227, 1231-32 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Gerrow, 232 F.3d 831, 834 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Ramsdale, 179 F.3d
1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Rodriguez-Velasquez, 132 F.3 d 698, 700
(nth Cir. 1998). Manifest injustice arises when the defendant did not receive the
lowest possible sentence within his Guideline range. See Quintana, 300 F.3d at
1232; Gerrow, 232 F.3d at 834; Rodriguez-Velasquez, 132 F.3d at 700.
183. United States v. Medrano, 5 F.3d 1214, 1219 (9th Cir. 1993).
184. It must be noted that the Ninth Circuit varies the most, as compared to other fed-
eral courts, in its expression and application of standards of review for defendant
allocution errors. As referenced above, in Mejia, the court ruled that where a de-
fendant received the lowest sentence possible, he could not claim prejudice from
the denial of his right to allocute. 953 F.2d 461; see supra note 18o and accompany-
ing text. Mejia directly contradicts United States v. Medrano, where the court ar-
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Ninth Circuit's broad approach closely resembles the reversible-error review for
correcting defendant allocution errors that is applied by a minority of courts.' s5
While focusing on whether the lack of allocution impacted the defendant's sen-
tence, the Ninth Circuit implies that unless a defendant received the statutory
mandatory minimum sentence for his crime, the denial of allocution should al-
ways be corrected.
2. Rule 52 Plain Error
Even if a court determines that a defendant was prejudiced by the denial of
his right to allocute, a remedy is not guaranteed if the court is proceeding under
a plain-error analysis. Under this analysis, a court can exercise its discretion and
decline to correct an error raised in an untimely manner by a defendant. 6 As
guided by the Court in United States v. Olano, correction should only occur
when the error (1) is plain, (2) affects the defendant's substantial rights, and (3)
"seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial pro-
ceedings."'sz
How courts approach the final prong of a plain-error analysis has varied.
Some courts have concluded that once they determine that the error prejudiced
the defendant or affected his substantial rights, the error must be corrected be-
cause defendant allocution "is the type of important safeguard that helps assure
the fairness, and hence legitimacy, of the sentencing process."'8 8 Without allo-
cution, the court denies the defendant the right to serve as his "most persuasive
and eloquent advocate,"'' 9 and the court is likewise denied the opportunity to
"take into consideration [the defendant's] unique perspective on the circum-
stances relevant to his sentence, delivered by his own voice.""'9 Therefore, some
courts show little hesitation in concluding that the denial of allocution is a seri-
ous error that warrants correction.
This approach hints that perhaps there may be something more to defen-
dant allocution than merely mitigating the defendant's sentence. Hearing from
the defendant is valuable, not only because it may impact his sentence, but also
because the equity of the proceeding is enhanced by ensuring that the court
hears from the defendant prior to pronouncing punishment.' 9' Echoing some-
ticulated a broad presumed-prejudice standard. 5 F.3d 1214; see supra note 183 and
accompanying text.
185. See infra notes 222-229.
186. See United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 284-85 (3d Cir. 2001).
187. 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993).
188. Adams, 252 F. 3d at 288.
189. Id.
19o. Id.
191. See, e.g., United States v. Cole, 27 F.3d 996, 999 (4 th Cir. 1994) ("When a defen-
dant was unable to address the court before being sentenced and the possibility
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thing akin to the rite-based approach to victim allocution, this view of defen-
dant allocution suggests that there is something inherently important about the
practice that should not be denied to the defendant. This approach, however,
has not been universally accepted.' 9 Some courts are hesitant to conclude that
the prejudice arising from the denial of the defendant's right to allocute is so
serious as to implicate the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceedings.' 93 For
these courts, there may be circumstances where a careful search of the trial re-
cord indicates that despite the allocution error, the integrity of the sentencing
proceeding remained intact 94 Therefore, even if a defendant is prejudiced by
the denial of his allocution rights, courts adopting this alternative review for the
practice deny the defendant a remedy.
IV. EQUAL RIGHTS FOR EQUAL RITES?
The preceding sections reveal that, in many respects, victim allocution un-
der the CVRA bears only a limited relation to defendant allocution under Rule
32. In contrast to defendant allocution, which is valued for its mitigating effects
on a defendant's sentence and enforced primarily when it can be shown that the
denial of the right impacted the defendant's sentence, victim allocution is en-
couraged not only because it may be relevant to the determination of the defen-
dant's sentence, but also because of the ritualistic and transformative values in-
herent in the right. Moreover, the manner in which courts determine when
denial of an allocution right should be corrected indicates a preference to cor-
remains that an exercise of the right of allocution could have led to a sentence less
than that received, we are of the firm opinion that fairness and integrity of the
court proceedings would be brought into serious disrepute were we to allow the
sentence to stand."); see also United States v. Prouty, 303 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir.
2002) ("Because allocution plays a central role in the sentencing process, the de-
nial of this right is 'not the sort of'isolat[edl' or 'abstract' error that does not im-
pact the 'fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings."' (altera-
tion in original) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1985))).
192. See United States v. Reyna, 358 F.3d 344, 352 (5th Cir. 2004) ("We decline to adopt
a blanket rule that once prejudice is found ... the error invariably requires correc-
tion.").
193. Id.
194. Id. at 353. For example, in United States v. Reyna, the court declined to correct an
allocution denial where the defendant had made several appearances before the
court for violations of his supervised release. Id. at 352. At his second appearance
before the court, the judge clearly informed the defendant of what his sentence
would be if he again violated his release terms. Id. at 352-53. The defendant had al-
ready been given the opportunity to allocute at his original sentencing and again
when he was resentenced upon his first violation of supervised release. Id. When
the defendant violated the terms of his supervised release a second time, the judge
sentenced the defendant to the terms the court set out at the earlier proceeding
and did not grant the defendant his allocution right. Id. at 352. Under these cir-
cumstances, the appellate court declined to correct the error. Id. at 353.
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rect victim allocution denials over defendant allocution denials. In light of the
different goals supporting the two practices, as well as the varying standards by
which they are enforced, one must question whether the invocation of defen-
dant allocution as a model for victim allocution bears much weight. Addition-
ally, one must question whether the imbalance between victim and defendant
allocution rights should be adjusted, and if so, in what manner.
A. Maintaining the Status Quo?
One could argue that there is no reason to equate victim and defendant al-
locution. While on the surface both practices involve the ritual of an individual
presenting his or her views before the court, the underlying theories for each
practice differ. In light of the different justifications for the practices, it may be
entirely appropriate that victim allocution and defendant allocution are not
matched. While victim and defendant allocution may share a common form
and name, they could simply be apples and oranges that find themselves in the
same fruit basket but share no other commonalities.
However, in acknowledging the incongruities between the two practices,
one cannot then ignore the mantra of victims' rights advocates and courts ex-
amining victim allocution, which declares that the victim's right to be heard at
sentencing should be equal to the right provided to defendants.1 95 As noted ear-
lier in this piece, the equal rights argument often raised by advocates to further
the advancement of victims' rights has been highly effective.' 96 And despite
some of the acknowledged weaknesses of the equal rights argument,1 9 it cannot
be wholly discounted. At its base, it embodies an understanding that crime
should not be reduced simply to a contest between a defendant and the state. In
an attempt to render impartial justice, injustice may result when a victim's in-
terests in the proceedings against her offender are ignored, sidelined, or treated
as secondary by the prosecution, the defense, and the court. As articulated by
one victim, "Why didn't anyone consult me? I was the one who was kidnapped,
not the State of Virginia. '19S Crime is indeed relational in that it represents a
breach of social trust in a number of different relationships-the offender and
the victim, the offender and his community, and the offender and our struc-
tured system of government 99 Promoting greater equality within the criminal
195. See Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court (Kenna 1), 435 F.3d lO11, 1o16 (9th Cir. 2oo6) (inter-
preting a victim's sentencing rights under the CVRA to put "crime victims on the
same footing" as defendants); United States v. Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341,
1347 (D. Utah 2005) ("The CVRA commands that victims should be treated
equally with the defendant, defense counsel, and the prosecutor ... .
196. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
198. See TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 9.
199. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
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justice process by recognizing and balancing these different interests is an im-
portant way to acknowledge the relational aspects of crime.
However, if the victims' rights advocates continue to employ an equal
rights argument as a means to further their cause, they must be honest and fair
in doing so. Failure in this regard undermines victims' rights advocates' effec-
tiveness and ability to bring about the genuine reforms needed in the criminal
justice system. Therefore, we should not ignore the imbalance that exists be-
tween victim and defendant allocution. The question then follows as to what
balance should be created between the two practices.
B. Narrowing Victim Allocution?
To the extent victims' and defendants' rights should be equalized and bal-
anced, the victim's allocution right could be pulled back and aligned more
closely with the defendant's allocution right. Of course, such an argument is
unlikely to sit well with victims' rights advocates. Curtailing victim allocution to
a realm of relevancy would return the victim to the role of witness for the gov-
ernment's case, thereby undermining the victim's status under the CVRA as an
independent participant."° Similarly, a narrower approach to victim allocution
would limit when the denial of the right could be corrected. As discussed ear-
lier, provided that a victim has complied with the CVRA's procedural require-
ments, case law indicates that a court's denial of the victim's right to be rea-
sonably heard at sentencing must be corrected." 1 However, if victim allocution
were treated in the same way that the majority of courts treat defendant allocu-
tion, a victim would lose the "indefeasible" right to speak,0 and would instead
possess only the chance to speak as deemed relevant by a court, or where the
victim was prejudiced by the denial of the right to allocute. °3
Viewing victim allocution solely through the lens of relevancy and preju-
dice is problematic. First, while victims may have obtained the status of "inde-
pendent participants" in the sentencing process under the CVRA, this position
does not make them full parties in the proceeding who possess enforceable in-
terests in the ultimate outcome of the proceedings, whether in terms of a verdict
or a specific sentence. 0 4 Even if a victim was displeased with the defendant's
sentence or believed she had relevant information to share with the court that
could impact the defendant's sentence, the victim lacks a cognizable and en-
forceable interest in the sentencing outcome. To analyze victim allocution deni-
200. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
2o1. See supra notes 42-50,114-121, and accompanying text.
202. Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court. (Kenna I), 435 F.3d lO1, 1o16 (9th Cir. 2006).
203. In this regard, my relevancy theory comes its closest to Professor Thomas's miti-
gation approach to defendant allocution. See Thomas, supra note 57, at 2643-44,
2649-53.
204. See supra notes 42-50.
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als in light of relevancy or prejudice to the sentencing outcome is therefore
misplaced.
Second, a relevancy-based review of victim allocution errors invokes the of-
ten-inaccurate dichotomy of the innocent and vengeful victim seeking a harsh
punishment for the reprehensible defendant." 5 Contrary to this image, there
are circumstances at sentencing where victims express statements of mercy, for-
giveness, or hope for the defendant's rehabilitation? 6 Hence, a victim's state-
ment could indeed be relevant to the defendant's sentence, but could mitigate
rather than aggravate the court's calculation of the defendant's punishment. If a
victim's statement could either increase or decrease the defendant's sentence,
then every failure of a court to hear from the victim could potentially affect the
defendant's punishment, and would thus always warrant resentencing. There-
fore, it would be difficult to administer a standard of review that requires calcu-
lating whether the victim's statement would have impacted the defendant's sen-
tence. Instead, a standard of review more aligned to a reversible-error standard
would appear better suited to the denial of a victim's allocution right, if only
from an efficiency standpoint.
Finally, limiting victim allocution to a relevancy theory undermines the
other important goals the practice seeks to advance. It would be difficult to base
the correction of victim allocution errors on prejudice to the victim based on
his lost opportunity to restore his dignity or educate the defendant."0 7 How does
one calculate the prejudice that arises when a victim is denied the opportunity
for empowerment or the chance to "look [the] defendant in the eye and let him
know the suffering his misconduct has caused"?2"' Again, a reversible-error
standard would more adeptly address these harms, which indeed is the ap-
proach that courts applying the CVRA appear to have adopted. 9 To approach
victim allocution otherwise would thwart the dignitary, cathartic, and participa-
tory components of the practice, which many victims deem just as valuable as
the ability to make a calculable, and presumably negative, impact on the defen-
dant's sentence." ' Consequently, narrowing victim allocution is an inappropri-
ate response.
205. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
2o6. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6o, at 137; Bierschbach, supra note ii, at 47; Erez,
supra note 18, at 497-98; Karmen, supra note 6o, at 162; Tobolowsky, supra note 14,
at 84-85.
207. See supra notes 120-121.
208. Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court (Kenna 1), 435 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006).
209. See supra Section II.D.
210. The empirical studies regarding victim perceptions of the value or worth of their
impact or allocution statements, as well as victims' participation at sentencing, are
mixed. Older studies indicate that victim satisfaction was often predicated by vic-
tims' perception that their participation made a difference to the case. See To-
bolowsky, supra note 14, at 89. However, more recent studies indicate otherwise.
See, e.g., Barnard, supra note 56, at 76; O'Hara, supra note 29, at 241. Professor
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C. Broadening Defendant Allocution
Instead, the scope and basis for defendant allocution should be brought up
to par with victim allocution. While the two practices currently appear to serve
different goals and purposes, they could be designed to share similar objectives.
Like victim allocution, defendant allocution could be advanced not only for its
relevancy or mitigating functions, but also for its ability to transform the defen-
dant through the ritualistic nature of the practice.
1. Limits to a Mitigation/Relevancy Theory for Defendant
Allocution
There are sound reasons to look beyond a mitigation or relevancy theory to
support defendant allocution. Despite courts' relative reliance upon the mitiga-
tion theory, the approach has its limits. 11 It is not always the case that what a
defendant says at sentencing can or will matter to his sentence." ' For example,
when a defendant is faced with a statutory mandatory minimum sentence, any-
thing he says in an attempt to reduce his sentence is futile and irrelevant."
Similarly, if obtaining a lower sentence really is the sole purpose of defendant
allocution, one must question whether defense counsel could easily, if not more
efficiently and effectively, fulfill this goal, thereby extinguishing the need to hear
from the defendant altogether. 14 Anything a defendant might say could be
deemed cumulative and irrelevant to the arguments already made by his attor-
Erez notes that victims are not as interested in changing sentencing outcomes as
they are in participating at sentencing. Erez, supra note 18, at 491-92. Victim satis-
faction with the criminal justice system is increased all the more where restorative
justice practices, such as victim-offender mediation, are integrated into the stan-
dard aspects of criminal procedure. See, e.g., Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 60,
at 116-18, 131-33; Bierschbach, supra note ii, at 46; Erik Luna & Barton Poulson, Re-
storative Justice in Federal Sentencing: An Unexpected Benefit of Booker?, 37
McGEORGE L. REV. 787, 799-8Ol (2006).
211. See Thomas, supra note 57, at 2655-66.
212. Id. at 2657-59.
213. Id. at 2657-58.
214. Id. at 2658. Despite the Supreme Court's faith in the persuasiveness of defendants'
"halting eloquence," Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961), an unedu-
cated or unsophisticated defendant's allocution statement may often work against
him due to his inability to "speak in the smooth, tutored jargon of professional
remorse" often heard from better-educated or "savvy" defendants, Natapoff, su-
pra note 126, at 1468. See also People v. Robbins, 755 P.2d 355, 371 (Cal. 1988)
(Broussard, J., concurring) (expressing concern that a defendant's allocution
statement in a capital case may work to his detriment where he is uneducated or
inarticulate).
26:431 2008
EQUAL RIGHTS FOR EQUAL RITES
ney,"I giving weight to the argument that defendant allocution has become an
empty formality."6
It is difficult, however, to conceive of an American legal system that renders
punishments without granting the party facing punishment one final opportu-
nity to be heard. Even if a defendant has nothing legally substantial to add to
the proceedings, most would agree that giving the defendant a final chance to
speak is important. The defendant's voice adds an intangible but important
"something" to the proceedings. 17 Indeed, some courts have stated that defen-
dants should have the "broad-ranging opportunity" '' s to speak on "any subject
of [their] choosing prior to the imposition of sentence."1 9 Such an approach
implies that the purpose of defendant allocution goes beyond merely impacting
the defendant's sentence. Rather, in his allocution statement, a defendant may
share information with the court which, while not directly relevant or capable
of mitigating his sentence, might fulfill other important goals such as providing
a therapeutic outlet for the defendant"2 and increasing the perceived and actual
equity, legitimacy, and fairness of the sentencing proceeding. 2 ' This alternative
215. See Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1530 (9th Cir. 1992) (deciding that error is
harmless where the defendant is denied the right to allocute but what he would
have stated was irrelevant or cumulative in light of statements made by defense
counsel); Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d 334, 337 (4th Cir. 1978) (same).
216. See supra note 137.
217. See Natapoff, supra note 126, at 1465-69; Thomas, supra note 57, at 2659; see also
Harris v. Maryland, 509 A.2d 120, 127 (Md. 1986) ("Most modern commentators
strongly advocate retention of the right of allocution, recognizing that the practice
in its present form serves a significant function no other procedural device can
completely replace.").
218. United States v. Myers, i5o F.3d 459, 462 (5th Cir. 1998).
219. United States v. De Alba Pagan, 33 F. 3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 1994). The defendant's
right to allocute, however, is not unlimited. Courts, especially those who adopt a
mitigating approach to the practice, emphasize that the right is not wholly free
from limitation. See United States v. Mack, 20o F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Leasure, 122 F.3d 837, 840 (9 th Cir. 1997); United States v. Muniz,
1 F.3d l1o8, 1025 (loth Cir. 1993).
220. See United States v. Jackson, 700 F.2d 181, 191 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he right of allo-
cution has survived 'more for its therapeutic effect on the defendant than its prac-
tical effect on the judge's determination."') (quoting 8A JAMES WM. MOORE ET
AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 32.05 (2d ed. 1982)); In re Shannon B., 27 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 800, 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (referring to the modern justification of re-
taining allocution for "its therapeutic effect"); State v. Carr, 374 A.2d 1107, 1117
(Conn. 1977); State v. Chow, 883 P.2d 663, 672 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994); People v.
Foy, 333 N.W.2d 596, 597 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); PETER W. Low, AM. BAR ASS'N,
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 255 (1968).
221. See, e.g., United States v. Quintana, 300 F.3d 1227, 1231 (nith Cir. 2002); United
States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 288 (3 d Cir. 2001); United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d
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view of defendant allocution is demonstrated by a scattered number of federal
courts that evaluate denials of defendant allocution under a reversible-error
standard.
2. Support for Broadening Defendant Allocution
As noted earlier, a majority of courts analyze defendant allocution denials
under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.2" However, at least
four circuits treat defendant allocution denials as reversible errors," 3 basing this
standard of review on Supreme Court precedent. In Hill v. United States, 2 4 the
Supreme Court cited to Van Hook v. United States,225 a decision the Court is-
sued just a month after the Green ruling, in discussing how allocution errors
should be reviewed and corrected. Van Hook was a two-sentence opinion that
remanded a case for resentencing in light of a trial court's failure to properly
comply with Rule 32.6 Van Hook and Hill demonstrate that when a defendant
is denied the right to allocute, the proper remedy is to remand the case for re-
sentencing. Following suit, the lower courts initially began treating allocution
denials as reversible error. 27 However, and as referenced earlier in this piece, a
979, 981 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Myers, 15o F.3d at 463; De Alba Pagan, 33
F.3d at 129; United States v. Barnes, 948 F.2d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1991); In re Shannon
B., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 804; LAFAvE, supra note 123, at 1231. In Chow, the Hawaii
Court of Appeals stated:
[W]e regard allocution to be a significant aspect of the fair treatment
which should be accorded a defendant in the sentencing process. The
American Bar Association states that "the policies behind permitting the
defendant to make a statement at sentencing have to do more with
maximizing the perceived equity of the process than with detecting mis-
information or obtaining a reliable impression of the defendant's charac-
ter." We would disagree with the characterization that allocution is "per-
ceived equity," however, because we believe the defendant's opportunity
to speak on his disposition is, as a matter of fact, essential to fair treat-
ment.
883 P.2d at 672 (citation omitted) (quoting AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 18-459 (2d ed. 198o)).
222. See supra Section III.C.
223. See United States v. Archer, 70 F.3d 1149, 1151 (loth Cir. 1995); United States v. Ax-
elrod, 48 F.3d 72, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1995); De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d at 129-30; Barnes, 948
F.2d at 332.
224. 368 U.S. 424 (1962).
225. 365 U.S. 609 (1961) (per curiam).
226. Id. at 6o9.
227. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 15o F.3d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 1998), abrogated by
United States v. Reyna, 358 F. 3d 344 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Phillips, 936
F.2d 1252, 1256 (ith Cir. 1991); United States v. Walker, 896 F.2d 295, 301 (8th Cir.
199o) ("It is now well settled that failure to comply with Rule 32(a)'s requirement
476
26:431 2008
EQUAL RIGHTS FOR EQUAL RITES
number of courts have shifted to a Rule 52 analysis for allocution denials." s
Nevertheless, a minority of courts still apply the sentencing approach indicated
by the Court in Hill and Van Hook.229
The overriding theme drawn from the cases taking a reversible-error ap-
proach to defendant allocution is that the defendant's right to allocute is impor-
tant not simply because it provides the defendant with an opportunity to im-
pact, and presumably lower, his sentence. Of course, these courts do not
discount the influence allocution may have on a defendant's sentence. How-
ever, because almost all sentencing decisions require courts to exercise some de-
gree of discretion in their sentencing determinations, 2 30 it is difficult to deter-
mine the extent to which a defendant's allocution statement might have altered
his sentence if he had been permitted to speak. The reversible-error approach
eliminates this guesswork. Denial of the right is presumed to matter in every
case, and hence should always be corrected.
Beyond calculably affecting a defendant's sentence, courts employing a re-
versible-error approach also signal that defendant allocution should be enforced
because of the inherent importance of the rite of allocution. These courts un-
derscore that there is something discordant in allowing a judge to pronounce a
sentence without hearing from the party being sentenced. The rite, and right, of
allocution, is therefore enforced not only for the tangible impact it may have on
a defendant's sentence, but also for its broader values and purposes.
3. The Rite of the Right
There is something distinctly ritualistic and ceremonial about a defendant
standing before a court and speaking on his own behalf. 3' In acknowledging
requires a remand for resentencing."); United States v. Serhant, 740 F.2d 548, 554
(7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Murphy, 530 F.2d 1, 2 (4 th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Gardner, 480 F.2d 929, 932 (loth Cir. 1973) superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in Smith v. United States, 551 F.2d 1193, 1196 (loth Cir. 1977);
Cuozzo v. United States, 325 F.2d 274, 276 (sth Cir. 1963); United States v. Alle-
grucci, 299 F.2d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 1962); United States v. Byars, 29o F.2d 515, 516-17
(6th Cir. 1961).
228. See supra Section III.C.
229. See supra notes 224-226 and accompanying text.
23o. The discretion of sentencing courts has been further increased since the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Booker. 543 U.S. 320 (2005); see supra note 181
(referencing the impact Booker has had on federal sentencing practice).
231. It is here where the humanization model for defendant allocution, as proffered by
Professor Thomas, is particularly apt. See Thomas, supra note 57, at 2645-47, 2666-
69. As the title of her model suggests, Professor Thomas argues defendant allocu-
tion should not be limited to its mitigating role, but should also serve to human-
ize the defendant, by providing the court with a broader picture of the defendant
and thereby ensuring that the punishment not only fits the crime, but also fits the
defendant. Id. at 2644 & n.2o. This humanizing function is furthered by the spe-
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that the rite of allocution is inherent in the right of allocution, one may draw
parallels from the rite-based goals of victim allocution-empowering the victim
and educating the defendant-and correspondingly apply them to defendant
allocution.
Practically speaking, and whether he likes it or not, the defendant is trans-
formed by being a central player in the ritual of trial and sentencing. He shifts
from being "the accused" to being either "the convicted" or "the exonerated."
Apart from this legally imposed transformation, the defendant's participation in
the ritual of sentencing may bring about more nuanced but equally important
changes in the defendant. Being acknowledged by the court and having the op-
portunity to "have his say" may therapeutically benefit the defendant in a man-
ner valued by courts and commentators.23
Whether the defendant experiences catharsis through the act of apology,233
or empowerment through statements of innocence or defiance, the defendant is
honored and dignified by being granted the opportunity to speak. As one state
court commented:
Standing convicted of a crime, the defendant should be accorded the
right to speak regardless of whether it will actually affect the sentence
ultimately impose [sic]. While any statement the defendant may make
might be "meaningless" in terms of the sentence to be received, we
cannot say that the individual defendant would regard his or her re-
marks as meaningless.234
Through the rite of allocution, the defendant is also afforded a sense of dignity
because the sentencing body must directly acknowledge him. The defendant is
no longer passively silent, but becomes an active "participant in the public insti-
tution of the criminal justice system that directly affects his life."235
Of course, defendants possess the right to testify on their own behalf during
other parts of the trial, thereby raising the legitimate question of whether there
is any need to broaden the defendant's right to speak at sentencing. Certainly,
in contrast to the victim, who cannot speak at trial unless called as a witness, the
defendant has the right to have his voice heard during other parts of the crimi-
cific facts a defendant may share with a court in his allocution statement, and also
by the defendant's very act of speaking.
232. See supra note 22o and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 60, at 9o ("Apology ... is a powerful rit-
ual for offenders, victims, and communities, one that criminal procedure could
facilitate by encouraging offenders to interact face to face with their victims."); see
also id. at 141-45 (discussing the role of defendant apology at sentencing).
234. People v. Smith, 292 N.W.2d 206, 207 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
235. Thomas, supra note 57, at 2673; see also Harris v. Maryland, 509 A.2d 120, 127 (Md.
1986) ("[T]he allocutory process provides a unique opportunity for the defendant
himself to face the sentencing body, without subjecting himself to cross-
examination, and to explain in his own words the circumstances of the crime and
his feelings regarding his conduct, culpability, and sentencing.").
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nal proceedings. One could posit that the defendant has been provided two dif-
ferent opportunities for speech: (1) his opportunity to testify on his own behalf
at trial, and (2) his "speech" through his unlawful acts against the victim and
state. The defendant's speech therefore should be limited relative to the victim's
speech at sentencing proceedings in order to remedy the imbalance created by
the defendant. Such an argument possesses an initial appeal as it captures one's
innate desire to see "justice" rendered.
However, to the extent that defendants do speak on their own behalf at
trial, their statements are likely to be carefully cabined and directed by defense
counsel. Moreover, any number of institutional incentives temper against de-
fendant speech.236 As a result, only a minority of those defendants who proceed
to trial choose to testify. 237 Likewise, an overwhelming majority of defendants
enter guilty pleas rather than proceeding to trial at all.23 s While entering a guilty
plea makes it more likely the defendant will receive a shorter sentence, doing so
also strips the defendant of his opportunity to be heard by the court.2 39 For
many defendants then, sentencing represents one of the few opportunities to be
directly acknowledged and heard by the court. 40
Additionally, the proposal to limit defendant speech at sentencing because
he has already "spoken" through his acts overlooks two important factors. First,
the defendant's speech, whether through apology or mere explanation, may fur-
ther correct rather than undermine the balance between the victim and defen-
dant. Victims are often plagued with the question of why a crime was commit-
ted against them or their loved ones. When a defendant feels permitted to
explain his actions, even if such an explanation does not express remorse or
apology, some of the victim's questions regarding the crime may be answered,
potentially furthering the victim's healing process.2 4' Moreover, a sentencing
procedure that allows for broader expression from both victims and defendants
provides a forum in which the moral and relational balance disrupted by the
defendant's criminal acts against the victim can be righted. 4 Of course, there is
236. For example, in Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court ruled that a defendant
has the right to remain silent upon arrest. 380 U.S. 436 (1966).
237. Natapoff, supra note 126, at 1450 & nn.2-3 (noting that only half of the defendants
who proceed to trial testify).
238. See id. at 1450 (noting that over ninety-five percent of defendants never go to
trial).
239. See id. at 1462.
240. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6o, at 95-98; Thomas, supra note 57, at 2648.
241. See, e.g., MARK S. UMBRIET & JEAN GREENWOOD, GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM-
SENSITIVE VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION: RESTORATIVE JUSTICE THROUGH DIA-
LOGUE 1, 5, 7 (2000) (discussing benefits to victims from engaging in victim-
offender mediation); Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6o, at 114 (discussing bene-
fits to victims from defendant allocution).
242. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
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no guarantee that a broader approach to defendant allocution will guarantee
healing for the victim or for the defendant. However, a rite-based approach to
defendant allocution is more likely than a mitigation approach to produce an
environment conducive to such restorative speech.
Second, despite the importance of viewing crime as a relational disturbance
between the defendant and victim, one must not forget that another aspect of
the relational aspect of crime exists between the defendant, his broader com-
munity, and the state. By speaking on his own behalf at sentencing, the defen-
dant may define, if not redefine, himself in terms of these other relationships.
Through speech, we enter into a relationship with our subject matter, and de-
fine ourselves accordingly. When defendants are afforded broader opportunities
to speak and be heard by the court, they are able to "attain and express their
understanding or misunderstanding of legal dictates, their views on the fairness
or unfairness of the procedures by which they are adjudicated, and, ultimately,
their acceptance or rejection of the process and its outcome."2 43 Those defen-
dants who refrain from speaking, either by choice or as a result of institutional
disincentives, "are less likely to understand their own cases, engage the dictates
of the law intellectually, accept the legitimacy of the outcomes, feel remorse, or
change as a result of the experience." 44 The rite of allocution, therefore, gives
the defendant an opportunity to define himself, his relationship with the law,
and his place in the world, in a manner separate and distinct from how he has
been defined by the state and defense counsel. 45 He can choose to express re-
morse and apology, to fervently assert his innocence, or to challenge the court
or broader societal structures.
In advocating for increased defendant speech in all phases of the criminal
justice process, Professor Alexandra Natapoff posits that when courts do not
hear from defendants, the effectiveness of the criminal justice system is also un-
dermined.46 Defendants are the subjects of a system designed specifically to re-
spond to their intentional bad acts with specific laws and corresponding pun-
ishments. However, when we do not fully hear from offenders, we are unable to
gauge how effectively the system conveys its expectations of acceptable social
behavior to them, or how fairly its rules and procedures are administered. Pro-
fessor Natapoff further contends that "[d]efendant silence ... maintains the ig-
norance of institutional players such as judges and prosecutors who never hear
the full story about the individuals before them, or indeed about the function-
ing of the justice system itself.'2 47 Hence, the system's strength and legitimacy is
243. Natapoff, supra note 126, at 1451.
244. Id.
245. See Thomas, supra note 57, at 2673-74 & n.176.
246. See Natapoff, supra note 126, at 1488.
247. Id. at 1499; see also Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A
Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1988) (discussing the important role that
narrative plays in the law by not only building shared understandings about the
world, but also by challenging one's perceptions regarding societal structures).
480
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undermined. "[A] marketplace of ideas that does not include defendant voices
is an impoverished one whose outcomes and conclusions are suspect. " 4s
The defendants' statements of defiance in United States v. Mitchell, 9
United States v. Kellogg,250 and United States v. Burgos-Andujar25 ' find fuller
meaning in this context. In each of those cases, the defendants' statements
served to their detriment at sentencing. Nonetheless, there may be value in pro-
viding defendants a forum in which they are able to personally challenge the le-
gal system, both to facilitate defendants' personal expression as well as to high-
light legitimate system-wide injustices and further necessary legal change.52
From a practical and advocacy standpoint, this may give some pause. There is
no question that by speaking broadly and defiantly, the defendants in Mitchell,
Kellogg, and Burgos-Andjuar undermined any mitigating power sentencing allo-
cution might provide. For a defendant, obtaining a shorter sentence by present-
ing oneself as silent or remorseful may far outweigh any therapeutic benefits or
broader empowerment proffered by engaging in broader speech at sentenc-
ing.53
However, some have questioned the value of limiting allocution solely to
defendant expressions of remorse.2 54 First, many courts reject defendant's prof-
fered apologies. 55 Moreover, where courts are receptive to remorse and apol-
248. Natapoff, supra note 126, at 1488.
249. 392 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1968) (draft dodger).
250. 955 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1992) (tax protester).
251. 275 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2001) (military protester); see also supra notes 153-161 and ac-
companying text (discussing Mitchell and Burgos-Andujar).
252. See Natapoff, supra note 126, at 1487-88, 1498-1502. Professor Thomas furthers this
argument by referencing Nelson Mandela's statements prior to being sentenced to
life imprisonment. His comments did not include apology or remorse, but instead
called for "an alternative vision of justice in the face of what he believed to be an
unjust system." Thomas, supra note 57, at 2665-66. While admittedly an extreme
example, Nelson Mandela's allocution speech nonetheless highlights that there
may be settings where a defendant's non-mitigating speech may have incalculable
value. Id. The system Mandela challenged and defied has now changed to resem-
ble Mandela's "alternative vision of justice."
253. I must acknowledge Norman Lefstein for pressing me on this point.
254. See generally Michael M. O'Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and "Acceptance of Re-
sponsibility": The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E1.I of the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1507 (1997) (addressing problems
that exist within the Sentencing Guidelines' "acceptance of responsibility" provi-
sions); Marshall, supra note 123 (contending that contemporary defendant allocu-
tion primarily includes only expressions of remorse, but questioning the effec-
tiveness of the practice).
255. See generally Bryan H. Ward, Sentencing Without Remorse, 38 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 131,
142-45 (2006) (describing how many courts reject defendants' proffered state-
ments of remorse).
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ogy, the savvy and articulate defendant may gain an advantage over the less
educated and demonstrative defendant.56 Allocution could also be manipulated
into a moment of forced public shaming or false contrition by defendants
thereby undermining the value of the process for the offender.25 7 Hence, a le-
gitimate tension exists between viewing defendant allocution as a mitigating
practice or as a means to therapeutically benefit the defendant. Certainly, em-
ploying allocution to obtain a shorter sentence-whether the defendant's ex-
pressions of remorse are strategic or not-may outweigh the therapeutic, but
less measurable benefits the defendant may obtain by speaking his truth to the
sentencing court. Similarly, broader defendant speech does not necessarily
guarantee institutional change, but could result in justifiably defiant defendants
being subjected to even harsher sentences because of their allocution speech.
For the reasons laid out in this Article, I nevertheless champion a broader
approach to defendant allocution. just as there is little measurable or tangible
benefit to the outcome of a sentencing hearing in granting a victim the right to
"look the defendant in the eye and let him know the suffering his misconduct
has caused,"25s the calculable benefits associated with allowing a defendant to
use his allocution right to protest his innocence or challenge the criminal justice
system are also limited. In fact, both could be viewed to undermine or distract
from the sentencing process, and might more appropriately be expressed in a
proceeding separate from sentencing. To narrow the scope of both victim and
defendant allocution speech, however, would separate the parties from the
power of the sentencing ritual and from the transformative benefits that inhere
within its procedures.
The expansive scope of victim allocution appropriately recognizes the many
layers which exist in the ritual of sentencing. In holding the defendant account-
able for his actions, a victim's broader speech, regardless of whether it tangibly
affects the defendant's sentence, provides an opportunity for transformation for
both the victim and defendant. It also reminds all present that crime is multi-
faceted. It implicates the victim and defendant, the defendant and his commu-
nity, and the defendant and the criminal justice system. Granting the defendant
an opportunity for a broader allocution, similar to that afforded to the victim,
recognizes that the defendant may also desire to define or transform the rela-
tionship between himself and the system exerting power over him.
A final benefit associated with expanding the rite of defendant allocution is
that a system which ensures that all relevant parties have been afforded an op-
portunity to be heard is perceived to be more equitable, legitimate, and just.259
Victims' rights advocates have effectively capitalized on the fairness and equity
argument in advancing the victim's right to be heard at sentencing. How could
256. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 6o, at 105; Ward, supra note 255, at 135; Mar-
shall, supra note 123, at 222-23.
257. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 60, at 98, 102-03.
258. Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court (Kenna 1), 435 F.3d ion, lo16-16 (9th Cir. 2006).
259. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
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a proceeding be fair when the party directly impacted by the crime is silenced?
The same argument should apply with equal force to the defendant. The indi-
vidual who will be directly impacted by the court's decision should be permit-
ted to address the court, thereby furthering the perception that the institution
rendering the sentence is fair and equitable. A public sentencing at which the
defendant is given the right to speak allows the state "to assure the appearance
of justice and to provide a ceremonial ritual at which society pronounces its
judgment."6' The symbolic rite of alocution therefore not only benefits the de-
fendant, but also the court, the state, and the public. 261 Finally, one should not
forget that a criminal trial is ultimately about the defendant. Certainly, the vic-
tim bears a deep and personal interest in the proceeding. It was the victim who
260. United States v. Curtis, 523 F.2d 1134, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In discussing this con-
cept in conjunction with the issue of open and public trials, the Supreme Court
has commented that
[tlhe crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of justice cannot
function in the dark; no community catharsis can occur if justice is
"done in a corner [or] in any covert manner." ... To work effectively, it
is important that society's criminal process "satisfy the appearance of jus-
tice," and the appearance of justice can best be provided by allowing
people to observe it.
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571-572 (198o) (citations
omitted) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)); The 1677 Conces-
sions and Agreements of West New Jersey, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBER-
TIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 188 (R. Perry ed., 1959)).
261. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 288 (3d Cir. 2001) ("[Allocution] is
the type of important safeguard that helps assure the fairness, and hence legiti-
macy, of the sentencing process."); United States v. Myers, 15o F.3d 459, 463 (sth
Cir. 1998) ("[T]he practice of allowing a defendant to speak before sentencing...
has symbolic, in addition to functional, aspects."); United States v. Cole, 27 F.3d
996, 999 ( 4 th Cir. 1994) ("When a defendant [is] unable to address the court be-
fore being sentenced and the possibility remains that an exercise of the right of al-
locution could have led to a sentence less than that received, we are of the firm
opinion that fairness and integrity of the court proceedings would be brought into
serious disrepute were we to allow the sentence to stand."); United States v. Bar-
nes, 948 F.2d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Aside from its practical role in sentencing,
the right has value in terms of 'maximizing the perceived equity of the process.'")
(quoting 3 AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 18-459 (2d ed.
198o)); see also United States v. Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1349 (D. Utah
2005) ("Part of the rite [of allocution] is a chance for the participants-the defen-
dant, the prosecution, and now the victim-to have their say before sentence is
imposed. That process is short circuited if one of the participants-the victim-is
denied an opportunity to speak."); United States v. Marcello, 370 F. Supp. 2d 745,
746 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 2005) ("[Tihe victim [is], in a moral sense, a party to the case
and.., should always be given the opportunity to testify at all sentencing hear-
ings .... ."); supra notes 96-97, 210, and accompanying text (regarding victims' sat-
isfaction with the criminal process where they have been given the opportunity to
participate in the sentencing proceeding).
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was robbed, assaulted, or who lost a loved one at the hands of the defendant.
However, it is the defendant who is subject to the power of the state and who
may be deprived of his liberty, and perhaps even his life, at the end of the pro-
ceeding. When contemplating what may be just and fair, a sentencing proceed-
ing that provides the defendant with a full opportunity for self-expression
should be advanced.
CONCLUSION
Debates surrounding the victims' rights movement should no longer re-
volve around the question of whether victims must be granted an independent
role in the criminal justice system. That day has already arrived. Instead, the
more appropriate question concerns how we should define the victim's ex-
panded role, and what implications that definition may have for how we should
review the defendant's place within criminal proceedings.26 In addressing this
question, one should always ask what balance, if any, should exist between the
rights of victims and the rights of defendants.
In the quest to render more equitable and balanced treatment for victims
and defendants in the criminal justice system, victims' rights advocates should
not be content to accept the apparent imbalance that exists between victim allo-
cution and defendant allocution in federal sentencing law. At present, victim
allocution is driven largely by the ritualistic, cathartic, and participatory goals it
serves, while defendant allocution is grounded in its mitigating functions. The
result is that a victim's right to allocute is more likely to be enforced and to pro-
vide a wider opportunity for self-expression at sentencing than a defendant's
right to allocute. Allocution, whether practiced by victims or defendants, should
not exist merely because of its calculable ability to alter the defendant's sen-
tence. Rather, allocution should instill within all individuals present and par-
ticipating at the proceeding the understanding that the speaker's views on the
matter before the court are valuable. Through the simple act of speaking and
being heard, the speaker, and his or her experiences, are honored. When both
victims and defendants can engage in a sentencing rite that dignifies the
speaker, allows for catharsis, and enhances the legitimacy of the sentencing
process, we may edge closer to a concept of fairness that is not strained to a
filament, but that is indeed true.263
262. See, e.g., BIoof, supra note 18, at 289; O'Hara, supra note 29, at 233-34, 241-42; To-
bolowsky, supra note 14, at 103.
263. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934).
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